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AN AMERICAN ODDITY: 
THE LAW, HISTORY, AND TOLL OF THE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT 
Nadav Shoked 
ABSTRACT—The school district is a staple of American law. As the local 
government tasked with controlling our public schools, the school district is 
so well-entrenched that lawmakers and commentators ignore its uniqueness 
as a legal institution. The school district is peculiar to American law, and it 
is a peculiarity within American law. General purpose governments—cities 
and counties—are the local governments controlling schools outside the 
United States. In the United States itself, these governments control almost 
all other major local functions. But they do not control education here. 
Why? Why does American law rely on a separate local government for the 
provision of education? This Article tackles this fundamental—yet 
heretofore largely neglected—historical and normative question. It offers a 
legal history of the school district, tracing its roots to colonial 
Massachusetts and chronicling its consolidation and spread through 
successive centuries. This exploration demonstrates that the school district 
was adopted as an expedient solution to varied practical problems 
presented by the unique patterns of early settlement that prevailed in 
different places and times in American history. Yet the historical 
investigation additionally shows that at distinct periods lawmakers, 
commentators, and activists also asserted substantive arguments, of 
potentially enduring relevance, for the school district’s embrace. These 
actors ascribed to the school district a capacity to outperform other, general 
purpose, local governments in promoting certain core values. Those 
normative values included citizen participation, community building, 
school improvement through expert management, and stable school 
funding. Unfortunately, due to modern legal, economic, and social 
developments, the current school district fails to serve any of these values 
that were at times attributed to its antecedents; worse, the contemporary 
school district often undermines them. Accordingly, the Article concludes 
that state lawmakers should consider abolishing the school district and 
bestowing control over schools on general governments.  
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In the first place God made idiots. This was for practice. Then he made 
school boards. 
—Mark Twain, Following the Equator: A Journey Around the World (1897) 
INTRODUCTION 
An hour’s drive north of New York City, a public school system is in 
dire straits. In 2013–2014, 46% of the students in the East Ramapo system, 
located in suburban Rockland County, New York, were “well below 
proficient” in English, and a whopping 55% attained that distinction in 
math.1 The students’ academic performance could not have been aided by 
the system’s constant elimination of teacher positions and closing of 
schools.2 A state report thus characterized the system as “in crisis.” It 
singled out the cause: East Ramapo’s uniquely generous funding of private 
schools. The local public school system serves 9,000 students, while the 
area’s remaining 24,000 school-aged children attend private schools. 
Students in the public schools are 91% African-American, Latino, or of 
Haitian descent, and 78% of them are poor.3 The students in the private 
schools, on the other hand, are all white Hasidim (i.e., members of an ultra-
orthodox Jewish sect).4 For years, the elected entity running the East 
Ramapo school system has been diverting resources towards these latter 
students in the private schools,5 thereby establishing a public school system 
cash-starved by design.  
1 HENRY M. GREENBERG, N.Y. STATE EDUC. DEP’T, EAST RAMAPO: A SCHOOL DISTRICT IN CRISIS 
7–8 (2014) (citing data from New York State school report cards). 
2 Id. at 29–32. Another report highlights the board’s failure to address disadvantaged students’ 
academic needs. N.Y. STATE EDUC. DEP’T, OFFICE OF BILINGUAL EDUCATION AND WORLD 
LANGUAGES MONITORING REPORT (2015), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2109116/
states-east-ramapo-ell-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/QP9A-RS6S]. 
3 GREENBERG, supra note 1, at 6. 
4 Id. 
5 A vast, growing, and grossly out of line with the state average portion of the district’s budget is 
dedicated to funding transportation and special education at private schools. Id. at 12, 15–17. In an 
extraordinary move, the state education commissioner rescinded her approval for the district’s 2017–
2018 budget, since it included increased funding for private school transportation (on days public 
schools are not open) despite cuts elsewhere. Letter from MaryEllen Elia, Comm’r, N.Y. State Educ. 
Dep’t, to Yehuda Weissmandl, President, Bd. of Educ., E. Ramapo Cent. Sch. Dist. (Apr. 21, 2017), 
http://www.ercsd.org/files/_bVDyC_/5f88d30a41a6a3d33745a49013852ec4/Elia_to_Weissmandl_re_
budget_-_04-21-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/VJT4-WQY8]. Earlier, the federal Department of Education’s 
Office for Civil Rights considered NAACP complaints about racial and religious discrimination and 
began monitoring the district’s procedures for placement of special education students in out-of-district 
schools (procedures which favored white children). Letter from Timothy Blanchard, Dir., N.Y. Office, 
to Willie Trotman, President, Spring Valley NAACP (Oct. 27, 2015), https://poweroften.us/wp-content/
uploads/2015/11/Determination-Letter-Spring-Valley-NAACP-East-Ramapo-CSD-02-11-1091-and-02-
15-1140.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8QY-DYH8]. Both students and taxpayers have challenged the school
board’s diversion of funds as a breach of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. Recently, the
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An hour’s drive west of New York City, public schools are also 
foundering. From 1950 to 2010, the population of Newark, New Jersey’s 
largest city, plummeted from 440,000 to 275,000, as employers and 
affluent residents decamped to the suburbs.6 The city’s student body 
became almost exclusively disadvantaged: of its 35,000 students, 16,500 
are African-American, 15,700 are Hispanic,7 and 15,000 (44%) live below 
the poverty line.8 Drawing on dwindling property tax revenues to serve this 
impoverished population, for years the system’s performance was, state 
officials concluded, “abysmal.”9 But in 2010 the system struck gold. 
Flanked by New Jersey’s governor and Newark’s mayor, Facebook founder 
Mark Zuckerberg pledged one hundred million dollars to the system—a 
sum other donors then matched.10 For Newark schools, money was no 
longer a problem. Still, five years following that historic announcement, 
with all the money spent, administered tests indicated that proficiency 
throughout the system in literacy and math had declined in every tested 
grade.11 The most thorough study of the grant assessed its effect as, at best, 
“a wash.”12 The study singled out the cause. The governor controlled the 
entity running the school system,13 and hence that entity could not 
students’ lawsuit was dismissed by the Second Circuit for lack of standing. Montesa v. Schwartz, 
836 F.3d 176, 201 (2d Cir. 2016). The taxpayers’ lawsuit is still ongoing in the district court. 
6 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NEW JERSEY: 2010, SUMMARY POPULATION AND HOUSING 
CHARACTERISTICS 14 (2012), https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/cph-1-32.pdf [https://perma.cc/
F6BR-NAZT]; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 1950 CENSUS 30-9 (1952). 
7 NEWARK PUBLIC SCHOOLS, DISTRICT INFORMATION, http://www.nps.k12.nj.us/info/ [https://
perma.cc/XNS3-SJMS]. 
8 Dale Russakoff, Schooled, NEW YORKER, May 19, 2014. 
9 Contini v. Bd. of Educ., 668 A.2d 434, 438 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995). The judge also 
noted “the low level of school attendance in Newark, the high level of students who ‘drop out’ after 
eighth grade[,] . . . the ‘deplorable condition of some of the physical facilities,’ the unavailability of 
textbooks, workbooks and other vital instructional materials in many schools” and cited the state 
education commissioner’s conclusion that “pupil performance data indicates . . . an utter failure by the 
[schools] to prepare [their] students to function as citizens and workers in society.” Id. 
10 Richard Pérez-Peña, Facebook Founder to Donate $100 Million to Help Remake Newark’s 
Schools, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/education/23newark.html 
[https://perma.cc/TE5F-UNF9]; Ruth Marcus, How Newark Schools Partially Squandered Mark 
Zuckerberg’s $100 Million Donation, WASH. POST (Oct. 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/how-newark-schools-partially-squandered-a-great-prize/2015/10/20/ffff660c-7743-11e5-a958-
d889faf561dc_story.html?utm_term=.89709d20f20f [https://perma.cc/3MTM-MBTK]. 
11 DALE RUSSAKOFF, THE PRIZE 204 (2015). 
12 Tom Moran, Opinion, Newark Students Are Better Off, Despite the Political Noise, NEWARK
STAR-LEDGER, Sept. 6, 2015. 
13 Contini, 668 A.2d at 437 (approving the takeover). 
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effectively engage the local community and the teachers’ union in the 
implementation of an improvement plan.14  
Two geographically proximate school systems. Both failing—though 
not due to the traditional culprit for the struggles of postwar American 
public schools: outsiders’ apathy.15 In East Ramapo, the majority of the 
public school system’s own residents, ultra-orthodox Jews who do not rely 
on public schools, elected officials intent on defunding schools serving 
others—the system’s minority residents.16 In Newark, the majority of the 
school system’s residents were excluded from its management and 
consequently would not cooperate with efforts to effectively employ funds 
outsiders had dedicated to the system. A similar, and noteworthy, fate was 
reached by both systems, through two different paths. While East 
Ramapo’s schools were saddled with an overinclusive electorate, Newark’s 
schools contended with an underinclusive one.  
These two seemingly disparate predicaments share more than the 
common unfortunate outcome each has bred, however. They are both 
symptoms of one common ailment: the curious legal entity running both 
school systems. The East Ramapo schools probably would not have been 
underfunded by locals had they been controlled by the Villages of Spring 
Valley and Chestnut Ridge, the Town of Haverstraw, and the other 
communities whose residents actually send their children to East Ramapo’s 
public schools. The Newark schools’ plans would not have been so 
forcefully resisted by locals as external dictates had the schools been 
controlled by the City of Newark, which answers to Newark’s residents. 
But in neither case were the schools managed by the traditional local 
government entities: the town, village, or city. Rather, the schools were 
managed by another, separate entity: the East Ramapo Central School 
District (that, unlike the villages and towns where the schools’ users reside, 
answers also to non-school users) and the Newark School District (that, 
14 David Kirp, How to Fix the Country’s Failing Schools. And How Not To., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/10/opinion/sunday/how-to-fix-the-countrys-failing-schools-
and-how-not-to.html [https://perma.cc/F4D3-C624]; James Piereson & Naomi Schaefer Riley, Opinion, 
Zuckerberg’s $100 Million Lesson, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 5, 2015, 7:17 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/zuckerbergs-100-million-lesson-1444087064 [https://perma.cc/YH5N-K65C]. 
15 Under federal law, Americans need not contribute to the funding of schools serving other locales. 
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 58 (1973). This decision “may be the most 
significant decision regarding public schools since Brown.” John Dayton & Anne Dupre, School 
Funding Litigation: Who’s Winning the War?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2351, 2352 (2004). On the ruling’s 
effects, see, for example, James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 258–60 
(1999). 
16 GREENBERG, supra note 1, at 10 (noting that since 2005, a majority of the board has been 
comprised of members of the Hasidic community, which today holds seven of the nine seats on the 
board). 
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unlike the city, can be subjected to gubernatorial control).17 But what is this 
curious entity—this “school district”? 
The entity’s contours and governance scheme do not correspond to 
existing, and primary, local political communities: in East Ramapo it 
encompasses multiple such communities, while in Newark it is managed by 
outsiders. Yet this entity still runs the schools. Why? Does this legal entity 
provide East Ramapo and Newark tangible benefits justifying the 
pathologies of representation it generates?  
These questions are important. For this legal entity—the school 
district—is not peculiar to East Ramapo and Newark. The school district is 
the basic building block of the public schooling system throughout the 
nation, an inexorable component of the legal architecture of governance in 
America.18 Why has American law created the entity known as the school 
district? Why, that is, has it established a special, independent local 
government entity to run the schools? What are the expected advantages of 
this autonomous entity, and can they offset its potential costs—some of 
them showcased in East Ramapo and Newark? 
This Article will tackle these questions, which heretofore have been 
largely left unaddressed—indeed, unasked. Although the school district is a 
reality of extraordinary consequence, as an institution, the district has 
remained mostly invisible to legal scholars.19 While prominent recent 
works have explored the legal standing of different local government 
entities—city,20 county,21 special district,22 unincorporated urban area,23 
17 School districts can be placed under state control. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7A-15.1 (West 2013). 
A city can be placed under “supervision,” but its political leadership cannot be removed. Id. § 52:27BB-
56. 
18 All states other than Hawaii rely on school districts. See infra Section I.A.1. 
19 Writers have addressed school districts’ distributive effects. E.g., Richard Thompson Ford, The 
Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1874–77 (1994); 
Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Resurrecting the Promise of Brown: Understanding and Remedying How 
the Supreme Court Reconstitutionalized Segregated Schools, 88 N.C. L. REV. 787 (2010). These works 
do not address the district’s institutional uniqueness. Quite the opposite: they aim to show that school 
districts exhibit the general problem presented by local government boundaries. See Richard Briffault, 
The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1132–41 
(1996). The key exception that does address the district as a special institution is another important 
essay by Richard Briffault: Richard Briffault, The Local School District in American Law, in BESIEGED 
24 (William Howell ed., 2005). That essay’s focus is mostly the district–state interface, not the district’s 
relationships with, and standing among, other local governments. 
20 See, e.g., Gerald Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1980). 
21 Michelle Wilde Anderson, Mapped Out of Local Democracy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 931 (2010). 
22 Nadav Shoked, Quasi-Cities, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1971 (2013). 
23 Michelle Wilde Anderson, Cities Inside Out, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1095 (2008). 
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extraterritorial zone,24 neighborhood25—the school district still awaits 
thorough analysis.  
This academic neglect is particularly striking since the school 
district’s peculiarity cries out for an explanation. Education is one of the 
key powers reserved to local governments,26 and it garners nearly 40% of 
local budgets nationwide.27 Yet education is the sole major local function 
whose administration has been consistently withdrawn from the purview of 
primary local governments—cities and counties—and entrusted to separate, 
and special, governments.28  
Furthermore, the school district is not only peerless in American law: 
it also lacks an equivalent elsewhere. Foreign legal systems that opt to 
preserve a role for localities in governing schools29 rely on existing local 
governments: cities and counties.30 They do not consistently rely on a 
24 Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, supra note 19. 
25 Nadav Shoked, The New Local, 100 VA. L. REV. 1323 (2014). 
26 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
27 See TAX FOUND., FACTS AND FIGURES ON GOVERNMENT FINANCE 263 tbl.F-5 (2004), 
https://files.taxfoundation.org/legacy/docs/7ca0eadb3813bc30417c0a3533491263.pdf [https://perma.cc/
STT6-ENB8] (indicating that 38% of municipal spending in 2002 was on education). 
28 In American law, special districts are service-oriented bodies assigned humble, non-politically-
charged tasks, e.g., mosquito abatement and sewage. Shoked, supra note 22, at 1973. 
29 Most systems centralize powers on the national or state level instead. E.g., NANCY WALSER, THE
ESSENTIAL SCHOOL BOARD BOOK xi–xii (2009) (discussing Australia); OECD, EDUCATION POLICY 
OUTLOOK: NEW ZEALAND 15 (2013), http://www.oecd.org/education/
EDUCATION%20POLICY%20OUTLOOK%20NEW%20ZEALAND_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/
4U9V-2A83]; CODE DE L’ÉDUCATION [C. ÉD.] [EDUCATION CODE] art. L211-1 (Fr.), 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006071191&idArticle=
LEGIARTI000006524493 [https://perma.cc/MWL8-XSG6] (“[E]ducation is a national service, whose 
organization and functioning are assured by the state . . . .”). 
30 See, e.g., Education Act 1902, 2 Edw. 7 c. 42, § 1 (Eng. & Wales) (“[T]he council of every 
county and of every county borough shall be the local education authority.”); Education Act 1945, 8 & 
9 Geo. 6 c. 67 (Scot.) (same); Compulsory Education Law, 5709–1949, § 1 (Isr.) (same); BRIGITTE 
LOHMAR & THOMAS ECKHARDT, THE EDUCATION SYSTEM IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
2013/2014, at 54 (2015), http://www.istp2016.org/fileadmin/Redaktion/Dokumente/documentation/
dossier_en_ebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/YLV9-ZPDT] (explaining that while the state is responsible for 
“internal school matters”—curriculum and teachers—”the school-maintaining bodies” for “external 
school matters”—e.g., school building and shutting down—are local authorities: towns and cities). 
Canadian provinces seemingly follow the American example and recognize school districts, but their 
goal is to accommodate disparate linguistic (and sometimes religious) communities cohabitating in the 
same locality. The federal charter mandates that parents be able to draw on schools of their language 
(French or English). Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11, § 23 (UK). Furthermore, for some provinces, the 
federal constitution requires “separate” school boards for the local minority religious group (Catholic or 
Protestant). Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c 3, § 93(2) (UK). Consequently, the same area may 
be covered by four school boards—English Protestant (often referred to as English-language “public”), 
English Catholic (often referred to as English-language “separate”), French Protestant (often referred to 
as French-language “public”), and French Catholic (often referred to as French-language “separate”)—
each board elected only by its supporters. 
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separate local entity to govern educational matters.31 The school district is 
thus a quintessentially American invention. 
This Article recounts the legal tale of this unique piece of Americana. 
That tale is doctrinal and normative, but also historical. The school district 
emerged early on, during colonial times, and to understand its current legal 
role, benefits, and costs, the forgotten process by which it was initially 
created back in colonial Massachusetts—and by which American law has 
been recreating it ever since—must be unearthed.  
As that process unfolded over the centuries, desires to assure efficient 
education, to promote democracy, and to advance social cohesion, all 
swirled around the school district.32 The district’s supporters offered it as an 
institution better equipped, as compared to existing local governments, to 
serve these goals. This multiplicity of goals explains the school district’s 
stranglehold on American normative imaginations. Inevitable tensions exist 
between these diverse values—for example, between democratic school 
governance and expertise-driven school management. At times these 
tensions bubbled over.33 Detractors would denounce the law’s embrace of 
the school district as doing little to advance the value they cherished most. 
Still, since the entity’s separate legal standing could always be credited 
with serving some values—even if at others’ expense—it maintained 
backers.34 Furthermore, since in some way the school district’s separate 
standing was associated with all pertinent values, detractors advocated 
adjustments to the district so that it could better promote the value they 
prioritized, rather than called for its outright abolition.35  
The school district has endured thanks to this pliability. The school 
district is as much a staple of American law in 2017 as it was in 1717, since 
it has been associated with a plethora of normative values. Indeed, with all 
the values typically attributed to local governments—citizen participation, 
efficient provision of public services, and community building.36 But the 
31 England experimented with school boards upon the introduction of its public schools in 1870. 
Elementary Education Act 1870, 33 & 34 Vict c. 75 (Eng. & Wales). But that system was abolished by 
the 1902 Act. Education Act 1902, 2 Edw. 7 c. 42, § 5 (Eng. & Wales). Scotland’s boards were 
similarly abolished in 1929. Local Government (Scotland) Act 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5 ch. 25, § 3 (UK). 
In 1986, the London Education Authority was made independent again, Local Government Act 1985, c. 
51, § 18 (UK), but it was eliminated in 1990. Education Reform Act 1988, c. 40, § 162 (UK) (decreeing 
that the London Education Authority shall cease to exist on April 1, 1990). 
32 See infra Section II.D. 
33 See infra Sections II.B–C. 
34 See, e.g., infra Section II.C. 
35 E.g., JESSE H. NEWLON, EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION AS SOCIAL POLICY 230 (1934). 
36 On the competing normative values assigned to local power, see, for example, Richard Briffault, 
Our Localism: Part II–Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 392–403 (1990). 
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misfortune today—a misfortune to which East Ramapo and Newark are sad 
testaments—is that the school district can no longer serve any of those 
vaunted values. A slew of twentieth-century court decisions and laws, 
political patterns, demographic shifts, and economic trends have conspired 
to cripple the school district’s ability to deliver on any of its normative 
promises. Thus, for example, the separately elected school district’s 
promise of securing the citizenry’s role in running the schools has been 
undermined by the advent of modern interest group dynamics.37 The 
separately governed school district’s promise of assuring stable school 
funding has been defeated by novel municipal tax laws that transformed 
school districts’ autonomy into a tool for funneling funds away from 
schools.38 Other historic justifications for the separate school district have 
similarly crumbled.  
Today’s school district not only fails to serve the justifications it was 
previously set to promote; more often than not, it actively subverts them. 
Accordingly, this Article’s centuries-long story of the school district 
concludes with a call for abandoning this American oddity. Normalcy—
local government law’s usual principles—should reign in the education 
field. The power to govern schools should be transferred to existing, 
general purpose local governments—the governments responsible for 
almost all other major local services. These governments now benefit from 
their modern remodeling through innovations such as civil service laws, 
and draw on novel legal tools such as interlocal contracts. Consequently, 
unlike in the past, they can effectively manage schools and promote the 
normative values once associated with the school district.39  
This proposal to eradicate school districts is radical but not unrealistic. 
Alerted by public education’s sad state, which is now conceived as a 
national crisis,40 some lawmakers have begun to examine the role school 
districts play.41 Several states have even begun altering existing regimes.42 
But in the absence of a full appreciation of the legal problem the school 
37 See infra Section III.A. 
38 See infra Section III.D. 
39 See infra Part IV. 
40 NAT’L COMM’N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUCATION, A NATION AT RISK (1983), 
https://www2.ed.gov/pubs/NatAtRisk/risk.html [https://perma.cc/NT3V-M8KE] (famously warning 
that “a rising tide of mediocrity” in schools is weakening the country in a competitive global economy). 
41 The title picked for a recent book about boards expresses this attitude: besieged. See supra note 
19. For a summary of criticisms, see MICHAEL W. KIRST & FREDERICK M. WIRT, THE POLITICAL
DYNAMICS OF AMERICAN EDUCATION 131 (4th ed. 2009).
42 See infra Part IV. 
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district presents, such reforms are prone to be partial.43 They may even 
compound the problem, as they have in Newark, where the governor was 
awarded control over the school district.44 As exemplified by that case, 
tinkering with the district is not enough.  
To reach this conclusion, the Article proceeds as follows. Part I draws 
the landscape of education’s governance. It offers a comprehensive 
portrayal of the legal relationship between the school district and other 
local governments. This review demonstrates the school district’s central 
role and its uniqueness in American law. Part II chronicles the emergence 
and evolution of this unique component of our governmental system. 
Tracing the school district’s development from colonial times to the 
twentieth century, it offers the first legal history of the school district.45 
This exercise shows that the school district was a creature of particular 
historical circumstances—notably, the dearth of local government bodies 
when public education was first introduced in disparate places. But the 
account also synthesizes principled grounds intermittently—but 
repeatedly—employed to fortify the detachment of schools’ governance 
from the governance of other local affairs. Part III then explains why these 
diverse normative reasons are no longer valid today. It reviews the 
detrimental effects of legal, economic, social, and political transformations 
on the school district’s capacity to promote the normative goals identified 
in Part II. In light of the discouraging findings respecting the school 
district’s current normative worth, Part IV turns to the district’s alternative: 
general local governments, highlighting attributes rendering them the better 
option for running schools today. It situates the Article’s suggestion among 
other reform efforts—most notably, mayoral takeovers of school districts. 
Such reforms’ animating principles, as well as shortcomings, strengthen the 
conclusion: the school district is a legal institution whose time has come 
and gone.  
43 Reforms aim at “reorganizing” school districts, rather than rethinking them. E.g., IND. CODE
§ 20-23-4-1 (2016).
44 See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
45 Scholars have authored histories of education, e.g., DIANE RAVITCH, THE GREAT SCHOOL WARS
(1974); LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 1783–1876 
(1980), but not of the school district. One economist claiming to tackle the problem merely explains the 
consolidation of one-room schools into bigger schools in the early twentieth century. William A. 
Fischel, Neither “Creatures of the State” Nor “Accidents of Geography”: The Creation of American 
Public School Districts in the Twentieth Century, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 177, 177–78 (2010). 
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I. THE LAW OF THE SCHOOL DISTRICT
In Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court proclaimed 
education “the most important function of state and local governments.”46 
However, as the identity of the defendant in that seminal case indicated, 
this most important function is not performed by the state itself or by its 
primary local governments. Rather, it is entrusted to a special government: 
the board of education, also referred to as the school board or district. This 
introductory Part sketches the school board’s institutional architecture. This 
exercise is important even independent of the ensuing Parts’ analysis, as 
education governance’s complicated legal structure has engendered some 
misunderstandings.47 This Part will sort out confusions by defining the 
district’s place in American law: first surveying the distribution of 
educational powers among the different layers of government (federal, 
state, and local); then detailing the school district’s nature as the local layer 
of government responsible for education; and finally clarifying the legal 
ramifications of the school district’s interactions with other local layer 
governments. From this analysis, the school district will appear as an 
important local government—the government awarded the legal 
responsibility for school management in America. Furthermore, it will 
emerge as a local government different in its legal standing from other 
special local governments similarly tasked with the provision of one 
specific service, and as a government that is also, almost always, politically 
independent from general local governments.  
A. The State and Education
In the federal constitutional scheme, education is a power reserved to 
the states.48 For their part, all state constitutions decree that the state 
provide education.49 To implement this mandate, the states install a chief 
state school officer, and forty-seven states also empower a state board of 
education.50 The chief school officer and state board members are 
appointed by the governor or elected by the citizens.51 The powers and 
46 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
47 See infra Section I.C. 
48 On limited federal involvement, see GENE MAEROFF, SCHOOL BOARDS IN AMERICA 101–05 
(2010). 
49 See Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance Reform Litigation, 
28 HARV. J. LEGIS. 307, 311 (1991). 
50 Mary Fulton, State Education Governance Models, STATENOTES (2011), http://www.ecs.org/
clearinghouse/77/78/7778.pdf [https://perma.cc/AWL4-2PYQ]. 
51 A breakdown by state is available at: VINCENT SCUDELLA, EDUC. COMM’N OF THE STATES,
STATE EDUCATION GOVERNANCE MODELS (2013), http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/01/08/70/
10870.pdf [https://perma.cc/DGE2-NZT2]. 
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duties of these state-level officials typically include certificating teachers,52 
establishing school building codes,53 dispersing federal funds,54 calculating 
state aid,55 collecting student and instructional data,56 and setting 
instructional standards.57 
All these tasks are supervisory: the state bodies monitor the public 
schools.58 Other than in Hawaii,59 state bodies leave actual management of 
schools to local entities: school boards.60 School boards govern 
geographical subdivisions of the state, often called school districts.61 As of 
2012, 12,880 districts existed nationwide (as compared to 19,519 cities and 
villages).62  
Like all other local governments, school districts are formally 
creatures of the state.63 Lacking inherent powers, they are political 
subdivisions established, maintained, and potentially abolished by the 
state.64 They hold only the powers state laws grant them, which are 
invariably subject to change.65 State laws commonly grant school districts 
powers to appoint teachers and prescribe salaries,66 select courses and 
52 Illinois provides a typical example. See, e.g., 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-3.9 (2012). 
53 See, e.g., id. at 5/2-3.12. 
54 See, e.g., id. at 5/2-3.26. 
55 See, e.g., id. at 5/2-3.84. 
56 See, e.g., id. at 5/2-3.31. 
57 See, e.g., id. at 5/27-1. 
58 See, e.g., id. at 5/2-3.3. 
59 HAW. REV. STAT. § 302A-1128 (2010) (granting the state board control over all schools). 
60 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF HAWAII OF 1968, at 430 (1973) 
(explaining that Hawaii’s system is unique). In several states, constitutions establish districts. See, e.g., 
COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 15; FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 4; VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 7. 
61 1–3 JAMES RAPP, EDUCATION LAW § 303(2) (last updated 2016). 
62 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INDIVIDUAL STATE DESCRIPTIONS: 2012, at viii–x (2013), 
https://www2.census.gov/govs/cog/2012isd.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6J9-Q2U8]. 
63 Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178–79 (1907) (“The State, therefore, at its pleasure may 
modify or withdraw all such powers, may take without compensation such property, hold it itself, or 
vest it in other agencies, expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with 
another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. All this may be done, conditionally 
or unconditionally, with or without the consent of the citizens, or even against their protest. In all these 
respects the State is supreme . . . .”). 
64 Fruit v. Metro. Sch. Dist., 172 N.E.2d 864, 866 (Ind. 1961) (“It is for the legislature to determine 
whether the administration of school systems shall be exercised by a state board or distributed to local 
school corporations.”); Tecumseh Sch. Dist. v. Throckmorton, 403 P.2d 102, 104 (Kan. 1965) 
(“[S]chool districts are purely creatures of the legislature and subject not only to its power to create but 
its power to modify or dissolve.”); see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 160.020 (2015) (setting 
circumstances wherein a school district dissolves). 
65 Sch. Dist. of Lansing v. State Bd. of Educ., 116 N.W.2d. 866, 869 (Mich. 1962) (“[E]ducation is 
not inherently a part of the local self-government of a municipality except insofar as the legislature may 
choose to make it such.”). 
66 See, e.g., 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-20.7 (2012). 
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textbooks,67 and assign students to specific schools.68 School districts are 
also tasked with establishing schools: they open schools,69 replace sites,70 
and close schools.71  
B. The School District as a Special Local Government
The school district is thus the local government responsible for the 
individual schools located within a defined area. American law recognizes 
many forms of local governments, and a local government’s standing 
differs with its form. Therefore, to grasp the school district’s nature, its 
specific status among local governments’ different forms must be 
pinpointed.  
Local government law distinguishes “general purpose” governments 
from “special purpose” governments.72 General purpose governments are 
subject to a plethora of rules concerning elections, financing, and 
administration.73 Special purpose governments, also known as special 
districts, are excused from many of these rules.74 The characteristics 
rendering a local government “special” and thus exempt from such 
regulation are contested.75 Traditional categorizations focus on special 
districts’ limited powers.76 Thus, governments exercising powers in 
multiple fields are deemed general, whereas governments whose authority 
is confined to a single field are considered special. Accordingly, for 
example, counties and cities are general governments, whereas water 
districts and housing authorities are special governments. 
Seeing that its functions are limited to a single purpose,77 the school 
district resembles the special government or district, and state laws often 
list the two side-by-side.78 Still, and as Justice Potter Stewart once noted, a 
school district “has a more pervasive influence in the community than do 
most other such special purpose authorities.”79 The reason is the enhanced 
social import of the service the school district provides—education—as 
67 See, e.g., id. at 5/10-20.8. 
68 See, e.g., id. at 5/10-21.3. 
69 See, e.g., id. at 5/10-22.36. 
70 See, e.g., id. at 5/10-22.13. 
71 See, e.g., id. at 5/10-22.22b. 
72 LYNN BAKER ET AL., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 53 (5th ed. 2015). 
73 Shoked, supra note 22, at 1987–90. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 1991–99. 
76 Id. 
77 See, e.g., 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-20 (2012). 
78 E.g., ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 8. 
79 Kramer v. Union Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 640 n.9 (1969) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
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compared to those delivered by other special districts (such as water 
districts and housing authorities).80 This is perhaps a “difference in degree,” 
yet courts have found it meaningful.81 Education’s public significance has 
led courts to subject school districts to regulations from which other special 
districts are spared, such as constitutional rules of citizen representation.82 
Consequently, the U.S. Census separates school districts from other special 
districts.83 
C. The School District and General Local Governments
Since it discharges the “most important function of local 
government,”84 the school district is a “special” special purpose local 
government. Still, it remains a special purpose local government: it is not 
the primary local government serving an area. That primary government, 
commonly viewed by residents as their politically constitutive community, 
is the presiding general purpose government.85  
The degree to which the school district is interlaced with this primary 
government defines the district’s role in residents’ lives and its status in 
American law. Two variables shape the relationship between the school 
district and the general government: degree of physical likeness and extent 
of political dependence. Each must be inspected separately.  
1. School District Boundaries.—As a local government existing in
forty-nine states, the school district exerts power over a defined substate 
area. The state delineates the boundaries of that area, as the school district 
is a state creature.86 In twenty-three states those boundaries do not 
correspond to the boundaries of general governments.87 That is, the area an 
individual school district covers may straddle more than one city or county, 
and the area covered by a city or county may be split between more than 
one school district. An example of such an arrangement is the Houston 
Independent School District, which does not cover the whole city of 
Houston while concurrently covering other area municipalities in whole or 
in part.  
80 Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and Local Governments, 60 U.
CHI. L. REV. 339, 356 (1993). 
81 Kramer, 395 U.S. at 640 n.9 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
82 Id. 
83 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 62, at v. 
84 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
85 BAKER ET AL., supra note 72, at 53–56. 
86 E.g., IOWA CODE § 275.1(2) (2017) (mandating reorganization and attachment of school districts 
in certain situations); id. § 275.3 (setting minimum size). 
87 Data collected from state maps and regulations, on file with author. 
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In the remaining twenty-six states, school district boundaries follow 
general governments’ boundaries.88 Variation exists among these states, 
however, since American law recognizes more than one general 
government whose boundaries can serve as template for an overlapping 
school district. Almost all states carve their territory into counties and then 
establish at least one more layer of general government below the county: 
the city, town, township, or village, presiding over county subareas.89 Given 
that multiple general governments could therefore reign over one area, 
school district boundaries designed to follow general government 
boundaries may take three different forms.90 In eight states school district 
lines correspond to county lines.91 In nine they correspond to sub-county 
general governments’ lines.92 The final nine states create school districts 
whose borders follow both county and subcounty lines: a school district 
exists tracing each county’s boundaries, while subareas within the county 
incorporated as cities are excluded from the countywide school district, 
each recognized as a separate school district whose boundaries trace the 
city’s.93 
2. School District Governance.—Geographical overlap between the
school district and a general government, found in some form in twenty-six 
states, means that the school district serves the same population that the 
overlapping general government (i.e., county or city) serves. It need not 
mean that the school district serves that general government. The latter type 
of relationship, which can be titled political overlap, implies that one body 
rules both the general government and the school district.94 A school 
district politically overlaps a general government if its governing board is 
appointed by the general government, rather than elected separately by 
residents.95 If such political overlap prevails, the general purpose local 
government is the entity actually administering the schools, and the 
88 Data collected from state maps and regulations, on file with author. 
89 BAKER ET AL., supra note 72, at 54–55. 
90 Data collected from state maps and regulations, on file with author. 
91 Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia. 
92 California, Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and 
Vermont. 
93 Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and 
Tennessee. 
94 Briffault, The Local School District in American Law, in BESIEGED, supra note 19, at 26–27. 
95 This binary distinction is somewhat misleading. In actuality, and perhaps inevitably, the district’s 
independence is a matter of degree. The separately elected district’s level of independence depends on 
its powers. The more powerful the district, the more meaningful its political independence. Most 
importantly, states differ in the extent of fiscal independence they award districts. The limits some of 
them impose (for example, requiring the submission of the district’s budget to the general government) 
are discussed infra notes 472–74 and accompanying text. 
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overlapping school district is not a government, but rather a branch or 
agency of that general government (the equivalent, for example, of the 
general government’s sanitation department).96 If, on the other hand, the 
school district is politically separate from the general government, then it is 
an independent, and thus meaningful, government.97 
This form of independent governance is the clear majority rule.98 The 
almost uniform practice in America is to politically detach the board 
managing the school district from the area’s general governments.99 In 
thirty-one states, members of all local school boards are elected separately 
by residents.100 In eighteen states, members of some boards are appointed: 
by mayors101 or governors.102 But even within this minority of states that 
establish some appointed boards, there are many other school boards that 
are independently elected—indeed, the vast majority of local boards in 
96 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, LISTS & STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENTS: DEFINITIONS, 
https://www.census.gov/govs/go/definitions.html [https://perma.cc/NW5Z-48CB]. 
97 The Census, thus, only counts as governments those school districts categorized as 
“independent,” classifying the other, “dependent,” school systems as mere government “agencies.” U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 62, at x. It finds 1,298 dependent school systems. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION SUMMARY REPORT: 2012, https://www.census.gov/content/dam/
Census/library/publications/2013/econ/g12-cg-org.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8BU-8J4C]. The test the 
Census employs to separate dependent from independent school districts is opaque, however, Briffault, 
The Local School District in American Law, in BESIEGED, supra note 19, at 26, and its results—
somewhat questionable. The Census singles out four states as containing no independent school 
districts: Hawaii—which, as already noted, has no school districts—Alaska, Maryland, and North 
Carolina. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 62, at x. Yet, a review of the laws of these other three states 
reveals that they all insist on designating school districts as independent entities. See, e.g., Tunley v. 
Anchorage Sch. Dist., 631 P.2d 67, 75 (Alaska 1980) (“While the school board is elected by the same 
voters as is the municipal assembly . . . it is a legislative body with legal responsibilities which in 
important respects are distinct from those exercised by the assembly.”). Maryland does empower the 
governor to appoint boards, MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 3-108 (LexisNexis 2014), but eighteen 
districts—of the state’s twenty-four—elect independent boards, id. § 3-114. In North Carolina, some 
boards are city-appointed, e.g., ASHEVILLE CITY SCHOOLS, N.C., POLICY CODE: 2110 (Feb. 2, 1998), 
http://www.ashevillecityschools.net/files/_xNKf7_/f07179dc6c6be12d3745a49013852ec4/2110.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2WEG-4MQW], but others are elected, e.g., CHAPEL HILL CARRBORO CITY SCHOOLS, 
N.C., POLICY CODE: 2110 (Apr. 23, 1998), https://boardpolicyonline.com/bl/
?b=chaphill#&&hs=142497 [https://perma.cc/VPP5-QRR2]. The North Carolina Supreme Court 
characterized the school district as “a governmental agency separate and distinct from the [c]ity.” State 
v. Cooke, 103 S.E.2d 846, 850 (N.C. 1958). 
98 MAEROFF, supra note 48, at 190 (“[F]ewer than 10 percent of the nation’s school board
members” are appointed.). 
99 Briffault, The Local School District in American Law, in BESIEGED, supra note 19, at 27. 
100 50-State Comparison: Local School Boards, EDUC. COMM’N OF THE STATES (2017), 
http://ecs.force.com/mbdata/mbquestRT?rep=K12G713 [https://perma.cc/6NHB-AR3C]. 
101 Id.; see, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2590-b(1)(a) (McKinney 2017) (describing New York City); 
105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/34-3(b) (2016) (describing Chicago). 
102 Local School Boards, supra note 100; see, e.g., supra note 17 (discussing New Jersey’s laws 
allowing for state takeover of school districts and their use in Newark). 
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those states are elected.103 Often an appointed board only reigns in the 
state’s major city or cities.104 Importantly, even when the school board is 
politically dependent on the general government, as it is in those few 
places, it remains a separate legal entity.105 Hence, for example, an 
appointed school district retains its separate financial standing106 and is 
sued and sues discretely,107 while city bodies cannot interfere with its 
decisions.108  
School districts that are politically dependent on a general government 
are thus atypical. Even in the few occasions where the district is politically 
dependent on the general government, that government does not normally 
control, nor is it liable for, the district’s acts. In American law, in sum, the 
school district is almost always starkly dissimilar from city agencies—such 
as police or licensing departments—which politically and legally are city 
organs. 
D. Summary: The School District’s Unique Legal Position
American law treats education’s provision and management in a 
unique fashion. The law’s approach stands out not because it entrusts the 
task to local governments: many functions are similarly delegated to local 
governments. Rather, the attitude towards education is striking due to the 
identity of the local government picked. In contrast to its practice 
103 For example, in South Carolina, only four of the eighty-one school districts are appointed. S.C.
SCHOOL BOARD ASS’N, BOARD MEMBER SELECTION AND MEETINGS (2016), http://scsba.org/general/
aboutus_schoolboardfacts_bdmemberselection.pdf [https://perma.cc/N886-TV3A]; see S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 59-19-40 (2016) (enabling variation between districts). Most often, only the largest city’s board is
appointed. See Local School Boards, supra note 100; see, e.g., supra note 101 (New York and
Chicago); 1991 MASS. ACTS 222–26 (Boston); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6-696 (2013) (Philadelphia). The
Pennsylvania provision, § 6-696, applies to districts of the “first class” and a separate state law
provision, 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 101, defines cities of the first class as those containing a population of
over one million—i.e., only Philadelphia. 
104 See Local School Boards, supra note 100; see, e.g., supra note 101 (New York and Chicago); 
1991 Mass. Acts 222–26 (Boston); 24 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6-696 (2013) (Philadelphia). The Pennsylvania 
provision, § 6-696, applies to districts of the “first class” and a separate state law provision, 53 Pa. Stat. 
Ann. § 101, defines cities of the first class as those containing a population of over one million—i.e., 
only Philadelphia. 
105 E. EDMUND REUTTER, JR., THE LAW OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 155 (4th ed. 1994) (“It is 
essential . . . to stress here the basic separateness of [school district and general local governments].”). 
106 See, e.g., Divisich v. Marshall, 22 N.E.2d 327, 328–29 (N.Y. 1939). Thus, they remain separate 
borrowers and a city is not liable for district debt. See, e.g., Fran Spielman & Lauren FitzPatrick, Rahm 
Likely Will Have to Rescue CPS, No Matter How Judge Rules, CHI. SUN-TIMES (Apr. 27, 2017, 6:24 
PM), http://chicago.suntimes.com/news/rahm-likely-will-have-to-rescue-cps-no-matter-how-judge-
rules/ [https://perma.cc/2MUT-KQ2W] (reporting on Chicago mayor’s lack of formal obligation—and 
potential voluntary choice—to finance the school district’s debt, despite his control of the district). 
107 See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-17-10; Divisich, 22 N.E.2d at 328. 
108 See, e.g., Divisich, 22 N.E.2d at 328. 
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respecting other vital local functions, the law refrains from empowering 
general local governments to supply and manage educational services. 
Instead, laws establish special local governments—school districts—for 
this purpose. These districts geographically overlap with general 
governments in slightly more than half the states, yet they remain 
politically and legally distinct from those governments nearly everywhere.  
To underscore this peculiar legal nature, consider the resulting reality 
prevalent in the twenty-six states mandating correlation between the 
district’s geographical boundaries and those of a general government. 
While the school district and the general government consequently serve 
the same population in these states, state laws insist on preserving the 
district’s political and legal detachment. Geography thus cannot be held 
responsible for school governance’s separation from governance over other 
local concerns—at least in these states. Law alone isolates it. The law 
assures that in America, education is a local function administered like no 
other. Detecting and assessing the motivations behind this strategy is the 
ensuing discussion’s assignment. 
II. THE HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL DISTRICT
The school district, as Part I demonstrated, occupies a special place in 
current American law. Why does the law rely on this peculiar institution? 
What normative values sustain it? An effective way to understand the 
rationales for the district’s existence is by tracing its evolution. This Part 
presents the school district’s legal history. The discussion unfolds 
chronologically, identifying transformative moments in the law’s approach 
to public education’s management.  
This Part’s story of the institution tasked with governing public 
education thus commences in Section II.A with a discussion of colonial 
Massachusetts: the birthplace, in America, of public schools, and, soon 
thereafter, of the school district. The school district then came of age as 
post-Independence America gradually grew into a democratic, capitalist, 
and continental republic. Section II.B accordingly presents the 
transmutations the school district underwent during the nineteenth century, 
which catapulted it into a government staple throughout the land. As that 
century neared conclusion, however, all established government precepts 
and institutions were strained and questioned, and so was the school 
district. Hence Section II.C focuses on the Progressive Era, when mass 
industrialization and immigration, alongside an accompanying reformist 
drive, reshaped the school district. The school district that emerged from 
those tumultuous decades of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
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centuries is the institution we know today, as described in Part I.109 
Therefore, after reviewing that portion of its history, this Part concludes 
with a summary of the normative justifications that sustained the school 
district throughout the different stages of its history, as discerned in the 
Part’s three Sections.  
A. The Nascent School District: Public Education
in Colonial Massachusetts 
1. The Original Legal Obligation to Provide Education: Satan and
Local Power.—The starting point for a history of public education
in America must be colonial Massachusetts. From its beginning, the 
Massachusetts Bay Colony was destined to blaze the trail for public 
education in the New World. The settlement of other early colonies was 
animated by material concerns;110 Massachusetts was different. It was 
established in 1629 with the aim of creating a perfect society. Its Puritan 
founders envisioned it “as a city upon a hill.”111 The biblical metaphor 
embodied an aspiration that the new outpost prove to those left behind in 
Europe that a community could be organized around Calvinist tenets.112 
Such a utopian ideal of society mandated a commitment to the education of 
the young.113 That commitment led, almost as a matter of course, to the 
establishment of the first public school system in America. It also led, as a 
matter of almost complete happenstance, to the establishment of the first 
school districts in the English-speaking world.  
Public education arrived on the colony’s shores early. In 1647, less 
than two decades following colonization, the Massachusetts Bay Colony’s 
legislature passed an act decreeing the creation of schools.114 The first 
109 Kenneth K. Wong & Emily Farris, Governance in Urban School Systems: Redrawing 
Institutional Boundaries, in SHAPING EDUCATION POLICY: POWER AND PROCESS 216 (Douglas E. 
Mitchell et al. eds., 2011) (explaining that though their number changed significantly over the years, 
districts’ design remained stable). 
110 See EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE ORDEAL OF 
COLONIAL VIRGINIA 45 (1975). Thus, throughout the colonial period, Virginia, for example, made no 
provision for public education. CORNELIUS J. HEATWOLE, A HISTORY OF EDUCATION IN VIRGINIA 58 
(1916) (explaining that the only colonial laws in Virginia pertaining to the training of the young were 
regulations limited to orphans and poor children). 
111 GOVERNOR JOHN WINTHROP, A MODEL OF CHRISTIAN CHARITY (1630). 
112 See PERRY MILLER, ERRAND INTO THE WILDERNESS 11–12 (1956). 
113 CAROLINE BENN & CLYDE CHITTY, THIRTY YEARS ON: IS COMPREHENSIVE EDUCATION ALIVE 
AND WELL OR STRUGGLING TO SURVIVE 1 (1996) (explaining that the modern concept of common 
education emerged following the Reformation). 
114 The Colony Records, 1642–1649, in 2 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN NEW ENGLAND 203 (Nathaniel B. Shurtleff ed., Boston, William White Press 
1853) [hereinafter RECORDS OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY]. 
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public education law in the world,115 its preamble gave voice to its Puritan 
underpinnings as it explained the law’s rationale: “It being one chief 
project of [the] ould deluder, Satan, to keep men from the knowledge of 
[the] Scriptures, . . . and to the end that learning may not be buried in [the] 
grave of our forefathers. . . . ”116 The law proceeded to oblige smaller towns 
to appoint a teacher, and towns numbering a hundred families or more to 
operate a “gram[m]ar school[].”117 Towns in breach were assessed annual 
fines.118  
The “ould deluder Satan” act is widely recognized as a landmark 
moment for American law: it inaugurated the public duty of providing 
schooling.119 It is also historic, however, for rendering this duty a local—
rather than colonial—obligation. It thereby set the blueprint for future 
American lawmakers. Yet, unlike modern lawmakers, the specific local 
entity the Act singled out was not a special purpose, new government. 
Rather, the onus was placed on existing, general governments—the towns 
themselves—to fulfill schooling obligations.  
2. School Governance Through Independence: The Town
Displaced.—The obligation to maintain the schools under the
“ould deluder Satan” act shifted away from the general governments that 
were its original repository and onto new and separate governments in a 
gradual process that unfolded throughout the colonial era. This shift, 
115 In Europe, at the time of the American Constitutional Convention, states did not meaningfully 
provide education. In the Catholic countries, “education as an affair of the State had not been thought 
of.” ELLWOOD P. CUBBERLEY, PUBLIC EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 85 (1934). During the 
Reformation, Martin Luther called for adoption of mandatory education laws and maintenance of 
schools. MARTIN LUTHER, Letter to the Councilmen of All Cities in Germany That They Establish and 
Maintain Christian Schools (1524), in 45 LUTHER’S WORKS 347 (Walther I. Brandt ed., 1962). 
Reformed states sometimes followed the call, yet the schools were to be run by the church, not the state. 
Thus, for example, as a result of the Scottish Reformation, the Scottish Privy Council adopted in 1616 a 
law mandating the creation of public schools that were to be supervised by the Episcopal Church. The 
School Establishment Act 1616, in 1 MISCELLANY OF THE MAITLAND CLUB: CONSISTING OF ORIGINAL 
PAPERS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE HISTORY AND LITERATURE OF SCOTLAND 22–
23 (1740). 
116 RECORDS OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY, supra note 114, at 203 (revised from original old English). 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Connecticut adopted an almost identical act in 1650. Code of Laws, Established by the General 
Court, May, 1650, in PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT 554–55 (J. Hammond 
Trumbull ed., Hartford, Brown & Parsons 1850). New Hampshire, when it was separated from 
Massachusetts in 1679, first adopted a law requiring towns to respect their current obligations towards, 
among others, schoolmasters. Bounds & Powers of Towns, &c., June 1686, in 1 LAWS OF NEW 
HAMPSHIRE: PROVINCE PERIOD 115 (Albert Stillman Batchellor ed., 1904). It then adopted an act 
replicating the Massachusetts one. An Act for the Settlement & Support of Grammar Schools, May 
1719, in 2 LAWS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE: PROVINCE PERIOD: 1702–1745, at 336 (Albert Stillman 
Batchellor ed., 1913). Throughout colonial times, these were the lone states providing public schooling. 
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completed by Independence, was precipitated by a confluence of two 
distinct efforts to address two separate challenges, both generated by the 
peculiar social circumstances and legal conditions of colonial 
Massachusetts. One challenge afflicted school management in the colony’s 
urban center, Boston. The other beset school management in the colony’s 
rural communities. Boston’s predicament led to the stripping of 
management responsibility from the general government, marking the 
demise of the political overlap between the town government and the entity 
governing the schools. The rural quandary was responsible for the erosion 
of the geographical overlap between town boundaries and those of the 
entity governing the schools. 
a. School governance in colonial Boston: the school
committee’s emergence.—In 1647, the year of the “ould
deluder Satan” law’s adoption, Boston appeared well-situated to implement 
the Act’s edicts through its existing town government: Boston had already 
established a public school, the continent’s first, more than a decade 
earlier.120 But Boston’s governance structure would prove unfit to manage 
schools, necessitating a new governance form—the school committee. 
Boston faced problems in managing schools due to its unique status in 
the era’s law. The common law of the seventeenth century established and 
governed cities as royally chartered corporations.121 Several major colonial 
cities assumed this guise.122 Boston’s residents, however, refused to 
incorporate.123 Instead, Boston became a “quasi corporation”: it functioned 
as a body politic and exercised corporate powers, but it lacked a charter.124 
The adamant opposition to incorporation stemmed from colonists’ 
abhorrence—grounded in their Puritan, communitarian faith—of 
government by a select few.125 The corporate form separates ownership 
from management.126 Like the business corporation governed by a handful 
of directors, a chartered English municipality was governed by a handful of 
councilors. Such a form of government, the Bostonians asserted, 
120 See infra note 129. 
121 Frug, supra note 20, at 1090–91. 
122 Howard Lee McBain, The Legal Status of the American Colonial City, 40 POL. SCI. Q. 177, 186 
(1925). 
123 JOSIAH QUINCY, A MUNICIPAL HISTORY OF THE TOWN AND CITY OF BOSTON 22–33, 40 
(Charles C. Little & James Brown eds., 1852). 
124 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 419–21 (John M. Gould ed., 1896). 
125 See Pauline Maier, The Revolutionary Origins of the American Corporation, 50 WM. & MARY 
Q. 51, 61–62 (1993).
126 ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 66–68, 112–13, 196–97 (Transaction Publishers 1991) (1932). 
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“destroy[s] that equality which ought to subsist in all republic[]s.”127 
Bostonians insisted on preserving the town’s existing form of government: 
government through town meetings, where all freemen voted.128 
Seeing that the town meeting was therefore the town’s sole legislative 
body, it was such a meeting that decided, in 1635, to establish America’s 
first public school—the Latin School.129 It was also through such town-
wide direct democracy that this school and others were managed. Town 
meetings made major, school-related “policy” decisions—such as 
taxation.130 They also settled minor daily management issues131: the 
schoolmaster was appointed by a town meeting vote,132 and teachers’ 
salaries and supplies were also sorted out there.133 
Such heightened direct democracy was, however, unsustainable in the 
long run. It was impractical to call a town meeting to discuss each minor 
school-related issue whenever it arose. Thus, gradually, the town meeting 
delegated daily management duties to the town’s selectmen: the town’s 
executive committee.134 Between 1644 and 1689, almost all records of 
school management in Boston are references to the selectmen’s acts or 
instructions addressed at them.135 The selectmen assumed the task of hiring 
teachers and of transacting in school lands.136 Over time, the practice was 
codified: a 1654 Massachusetts act commended to the selectmen teacher 
supervision and removal,137 and a 1693 act held them responsible, alongside 
127 Incorporation, pro and con., MASS. CENTINEL, Nov. 9, 1785. 
128 See Boston, MASS. CENTINEL, May 15, 1784. 
129 See Boston Town Records, 1635, in SECOND REPORT OF THE RECORD COMMISSIONERS OF THE
CITY OF BOSTON 4–5 (2d ed. 1881); Boston Latin School, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Boston-Latin-School [https://perma.cc/4TD9-QRRU]. 
130 See, e.g., Boston Town Records, 1645, in SECOND REPORT, supra note 129, at 86 (discussing a 
tax set at a 1645 meeting). 
131 HENRY SUZZALLO, THE RISE OF LOCAL SCHOOL SUPERVISION IN MASSACHUSETTS 5–8 (1906). 
132 Id. at 5. 
133 EDWARD M. HARTWELL ET AL., BOSTON AND ITS STORY 162 (1916). 
134 A 1641 act empowered towns to choose “a convenient number of fitt men to order the planting 
or prudentiall occasions of that Town, according to Instructions given to them in writeing.” MASS. 
BODY OF LIBERTIES § 74. That same year Boston named individuals as “chosen to order the Town’s 
occasions.” Boston Town Records, 1641, in SECOND REPORT OF THE RECORD COMMISSIONERS OF THE 
CITY OF BOSTON 61 (1877). They are first alluded to as “selectmen” in 1642. Id. at 72. 
135 SUZZALLO, supra note 131, at 14–15. 
136 Boston Town Records, 1655, in SECOND REPORT, supra note 134, at 129; Boston Town 
Records, 1657, in SECOND REPORT, supra note 134, at 140; Boston Town Records, 1711, in 8 REPORT 
OF THE RECORD COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF BOSTON 76 (1883); Boston Town Records, 1714, in 
8 REPORT, supra, at 103. 
137 3 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY 343–44 
(Nathaniel B. Shurtleff ed., 1854). 
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the town meeting, for teachers’ maintenance.138 A 1711 act then placed the 
power to certify teachers with the selectmen.139  
But the degree to which the selectmen could improve on the town 
meeting’s shortcomings in school management was checked. Selectmen 
were limited in time, powers, and ability to acquire experience.140 They 
lacked legislative capacities,141 and as executives their effectiveness was 
curbed by the need to constantly stand for reelection: terms originally stood 
at six months, and later at one year.142 The town’s scheme for school 
governance needed further adjustment.143 
That adjustment begot the first step towards the separate school board. 
Beginning in the early eighteenth century, a mechanism was devised to aid 
the selectmen in their challenge of supervising schools: periodically 
appointed “visitation committees.”144 The first such committee was 
appointed in 1709 on an ad hoc basis to seemingly treat a specific matter: 
the Latin School master’s salary.145 But that committee exceeded its 
mandate and advocated a permanent arrangement for effective school 
supervision through appointing “inspectors of the school.”146 The town 
meeting abided, first intermittently,147 then, starting in 1720, consistently.148 
The town meeting initially assigned the visitation committee the task of 
138 1 THE ACTS AND RESOLVES, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, OF THE PROVINCE OF THE MASSACHUSETTS
BAY 63 (Ellis Ames et al. eds., 1869). 
139 Id. at 681–82. 
140 SUZZALLO, supra note 131, at 61. 
141 For example, selectmen could not set teachers’ pay. Id. at 28–30. 
142 DARRETT B. RUTMAN, WINTHROP’S BOSTON: PORTRAIT OF A PURITAN TOWN 1630–1649, at 
224 (1965). 
143 The first reaction to the selectmen’s deficiencies was a short-lived resolution to “restore [the] 
former Custome & practice in managing the affaires of the free schools.” Boston Town Records, 1689, 
in 7 REPORT OF THE RECORD COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF BOSTON 197 (1881). 
144 Often the town meeting instructed the selectmen to select people to join them in a visitation 
committee. E.g., Boston Town Records, 1721, in 8 REPORT, supra note 136, at 163. 
145 The original town meeting establishing the committee did not refer to it as a visitation 
committee—but rather as a “committee to consider the affairs relating to the free grammar school.” 
Boston Town Records, 1709, in 8 REPORT, supra note 136, at 63. An earlier committee had already 
once made recommendations respecting schooling affairs. An ad hoc committee constituted to treat a 
non-school-related matter—a transaction with town-owned land in Braintree—recommended that 
proceeds be used for school purposes. Boston Town Records, 1708, in 8 REPORT, supra note 136, at 56. 
146 Boston Town Records, 1709-1710, in 8 REPORT, supra note 136, at 65–66. 
147 For example, in 1712 an ad hoc committee was elected to report on the advisability of 
establishing a writing school in the North End; “Inspectors of the Grammar Schools for the year 
ensuing” were elected in 1718. HARTWELL ET AL., supra note 133, at 162–63. 
148 E.g., Boston Town Records, 1720, in 8 REPORT, supra note 136, at 151; Boston Town Records, 
1721, in 8 REPORT, supra note 136, at 162; Boston Town Records, 1722, in 8 REPORT, supra note 136, 
at 171. 
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visiting the schools and inspecting their performance. Later, the committee 
began recommending teacher dismissals149 and instructing teachers.150 
Throughout the closing decades of the colonial era, the visitation 
committee established its presence within Boston’s governance scheme.151 
Like committees in other fields, its creation owed to the town meeting’s 
inability to provide specialized and ongoing administration.152 This need 
delineated the committee’s role, including its close ties to the general town 
government. The town meeting remained the legislative body governing 
the schools,153 appointing, at its pleasure, the advisory visitation 
committee—whose advice it always then followed.154 
This informal, officially dependent committee, a creature of the 
colonial era, was transformed into a formal school committee with separate 
and established powers—into, that is, a “school board”—at the end of the 
colonial era. In the Revolution’s aftermath, the town meeting appointed a 
committee to draft a new school system.155 The 1789 drafting committee 
had to settle a raging debate: in a free society, how public should public 
schools be in ethos, constituency, and governance? Some prominent 
Bostonians, like John Adams, fearing popular mobs unleashed by old 
constraints’ collapse, believed that only the elite should participate in 
government, and that high-level education should be its lot alone.156 Others, 
led by Samuel Adams, condemned, as a threat to democracy, public 
schools’ drift towards the model of exclusivity set by private schools.157  
Through testimonials, the appointed drafting committee learned that 
most Bostonians shared this second view.158 Residents desired public 
schools that would instill, in a diverse student body, the values of the entire 
community.159 Such schools, the committee reckoned, could not be 
maintained through the existing governance system: visitation committees 
consisted of notables, often appointed by the selectmen rather than the 
149 Boston Town Records, 1721, in 8 REPORT, supra note 136, at 164. 
150 Boston Town Records of 1724, in 13 REPORT OF THE RECORD COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF
BOSTON 134, 153, 165 (1885). 
151 The earliest existing records of a school committee are from Salem, dating to 1712. GEORGE H.
MARTIN, THE EVOLUTION OF THE MASSACHUSETTS PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM 150–51 (1898). 
152 STANLEY K. SCHULTZ, THE CULTURE FACTORY: BOSTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 1789–1860, at 6 
(1973). 
153 Thus, for example, the town meeting still voted on appropriations. Id. at 7. 
154 SUZZALLO, supra note 131, at 107. 
155 Boston Town Records, 1726, in 13 REPORT, supra note 150, at 153. 
156 SCHULTZ, supra note 152, at 12. 
157 Id. at 12–13. 
158 Id. at 13–14. 
159 Id. 
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town people. A more representative body was desired.160 Yet, colonial 
experience had taught that the town’s sole existing popular body—the town 
meeting—was inadequate for the task.  
Guided by the committee’s report, the town meeting proceeded to 
solve this conundrum by erecting a new, popularly elected body to control 
schools. An ordinance, “The System of Public Education,” was adopted.161 
This ordinance lay, as one historian observed, “the foundation of the first 
comprehensive system of public schools in any American city.”162 The 
ordinance detailed the number of schools to exist in different 
neighborhoods, students’ ages, and curriculum.163 Most importantly for our 
purposes, it entrusted the schools’ management into the hands of a new 
body: the “school committee.” This committee was to consist of twelve 
members elected by residents. Its duties included regularly inspecting the 
schools, devising rules for the schools’ management, setting school days 
and hours, and determining instruction methods.164  
This new school committee was the first continuous, politically 
separate government controlling schools in history.165 Its genesis, as this 
Section illustrated, can be attributed to early Boston’s peculiar quandaries: 
an emerging metropolis whose population was dedicated to democratic 
values yet lacked representative bodies.166 These unique local foundations 
notwithstanding, the school committee model was—eventually—to spread 
well beyond Boston. 
b. School governance in rural colonial Massachusetts: the
school district’s emergence.—While the crumbling of the
political overlap between school and general governance—the emergence 
of the school committee—was the child of the colony’s urban center, the 
breakdown of the geographical overlap between the school government’s 
boundaries and the general government’s—the emergence of the school 
160 Id. at 19. 
161 Boston, Mass., Ordinance, The System of Public Education (Oct. 15, 1789). 
162 SCHULTZ, supra note 152, at 14. 
163 Boston, Mass., Ordinance, The System of Public Education. 
164 Within a month, the committee picked books to be used in schools, settled on a curriculum for 
arithmetic, determined eligibility criteria for students, and divided schools into classes. Id. at 3. Less 
than three months later, the town meeting voted to make the committee’s powers general. Boston Town 
Records, 1790, 31 VOLUME OF RECORDS RELATING TO THE EARLY HISTORY OF BOSTON 215 (1903). 
165 It was preceded by a much earlier scheme adopted by Dorchester in 1645, whereby schools 
were to be controlled by three Wardens chosen for life. Ironically, the scheme was short-lived. 
HARTWELL ET AL., supra note 133, at 81–82. One commentator doubts it was ever implemented. 
SUZZALLO, supra note 131, at 70. 
166 A few other towns had already relied sporadically on temporary committees. SUZZALLO, supra 
note 131, at 63–67. 
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district—finds its origins in Massachusetts’s more rural areas. Originally, 
like Boston, Massachusetts’s smaller communities governed schools 
through town meetings.167 Unlike in Boston, direct control through town 
meetings was sustainable as populations remained relatively small. The 
problem these communities encountered in due course was different: the 
spatial spread of their small populations rendered the town school itself 
unsustainable. 
At the outset of colonial settlement, all residences in a New England 
town were located in vicinity to the town center, the site of its civic 
institutions: town hall, church, and school.168 Puritan leanings mandated 
closeness.169 But by the eighteenth century, religious commandments’ hold 
lessened, while the allure of uncultivated land in town outskirts grew.170 As 
a result, residents began migrating from the center.171 Such dispersal 
complicated the town’s religious and civic life. Towns began subdividing 
themselves into church parishes with their own ministers, to road districts 
maintaining their own roads, and then into separate districts for militia 
recruitment and tax collection.172 Such parishes and districts, though set for 
specific goals, became the sites of political demands for new subtown 
facilities, among them schools.173 
The problem presented by the existing schooling system, revolving 
around the town school, was apparent. As towns’ populations scattered, 
fewer children could conveniently attend the town school.174 Parents hardly 
relying on the school would only grudgingly commit taxes to fund it.175 
Consequently, in the eighteenth century’s opening decades a growing 
number of towns were fined for breaching their obligations under the “ould 
167 Id. at 7–8. 
168 SUMNER CHILTON POWELL, PURITAN VILLAGE: THE FORMATION OF A NEW ENGLAND TOWN 
7–8 (1963). 
169 RICHARD E. FOGLESONG, PLANNING THE CAPITALIST CITY: THE COLONIAL ERA TO THE 1920S 
36 (1986). 
170 The disappearance of Indian threats following Queen Anne’s War further lessened incentives to 
congregate. MARTIN, supra note 151, at 74. 
171 MACY CAMPBELL, RURAL LIFE AT THE CROSSROADS 281 (1927). 
172 CUBBERLEY, supra note 115, at 69–72. 
173 Id. at 72. 
174 Id. at 69–72. 
175 See GEORGE WINGATE CHASE, HISTORY OF HAVERHILL, MASSACHUSETTS, FROM ITS FIRST
SETTLEMENT, IN 1640, TO THE YEAR 1860, at 237 (1861) (reporting on petitions by residents of 
Haverhill in 1712 for exemption from school tax due to the town school’s remoteness). 
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deluder Satan” law.176 A disapproving colonial legislature increased the 
fines in 1702 and 1718.177 
To avoid this increasingly costly liability, towns had to persuade 
remote districts’ and parishes’ residents to pay taxes. After attempts at 
moving the town school between districts178 were derailed by practical 
hurdles,179 towns abandoned the idea of the town school altogether. They 
succumbed to pressure from the parishes and districts and began operating 
multiple schools—assigning a school to each district.180 Furthermore, the 
town meeting ceded to each district’s residents control over their district’s 
school.181 Local residents would not only pick their school’s site, but also 
appoint teachers.182 In 1768 the colonial legislature endorsed the trend: 
acknowledging the difficulty in providing schooling in towns’ remote 
“precincts,” it empowered individual precincts to raise funds for their own 
schools.183 Next came the landmark step—the legislature fully formalized 
such precincts’ position. 
3. The 1789 Act: The School Board and District Legislated.—In
1789, the newly independent state of Massachusetts updated its colonial 
educational system via a new statute.184 In its school governance provisions, 
this 1789 Act instituted both of the developments discussed in the 
preceding Section: Boston’s development of the politically distinct school 
committee, and the smaller communities’ establishment of geographically 
distinct school districts. On the former front, the Act consistently listed 
among the bodies responsible for a town’s schooling obligations the school 
“committee.”185 Furthermore, by expanding towns’ educational duties, 
176 MARTIN, supra note 151, at 69–70. 
177 Act of June 28, 1701, ch. 10, § 1, 1701 Mass. Acts 470, 470; Act of June 17, 1718, ch. 2, 
1718 Mass. Acts 100. 
178 Under the “moving school” scheme, the town school stayed in each parish for a time period 
proportional to the education taxes paid by each. CUBBERLEY, supra note 115, at 72. Haverhill adopted 
this scheme in 1711. CHASE, supra note 175, at 237. 
179 Not too surprisingly, records indicate that towns encountered difficulty in hiring teachers 
willing to constantly move. Id. at 236. 
180 For example, in 1711, petitions for separate schools in parts of Haverhill were accepted by the 
town meeting, and in 1714, another such petition was rejected. Id. at 237–39. 
181 Id. at 457; WILLIAM J. REESE, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN HIGH SCHOOL 25 (1995). 
182 CUBBERLEY, supra note 115, at 72–73, 72 n.1. 
183 Act of Feb. 26, 1768, ch. 16, 1768 Mass. Acts 988. Two years earlier, Connecticut provided that 
“each Town . . . shall have full Power and Authority to divide themselves into proper and necessary 
Districts for keeping their Schools.” Act of Oct. 9, 1766, 1766 Conn. Pub. Acts 327. New Hampshire 
was the first state to approve the practice in 1716. Act of May 18, 1716, 1716 N.H. Laws 203. 
184 Act of June 25, 1789, ch. 19, 1789 Mass. Acts 416. 
185 Id. 
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saddling their existing governments with new and complex obligations,186 
the Act generated everywhere the conditions that had already pressed 
Boston’s town government to create a separate school committee.187 On the 
district front, the 1789 Act consistently listed not just towns, but also 
“districts,” as holders of duties and powers.188 Indeed, it noted no difference 
between the two entities—so much so that districts, like towns, were 
authorized to subdivide themselves into districts.  
While formally the state legislature in this 1789 law did not combine 
the two ideas—the separate school committee and the individual school 
district—towns proceeded to do so.189 Several towns created multiple 
district committees.190 One even forsook for a while a town-wide school 
committee, maintaining only separately elected district committees.191  
Massachusetts thus exited its colonial journey with a school 
governance scheme very different from the one it had when embarking on 
that journey. The initial principle of reliance on local governments was 
never abandoned, but the identity of the local government relied upon was 
altered. The shift away from general governments—towns—was not, 
despite later commentators’ claims,192 primarily the result of principled 
institutional design choices. Rather, it was first and foremost generated by 
the era’s special exigencies. The school committee, as a separate political 
body, was the fruit of an unyielding desire among Bostonians to retain 
democratic control over schools when the town’s legal regime, inspired by 
Puritan ideals, offered no forum for effective democratic control. Similarly, 
the school district, as a geographical subdivision, was a product of unique 
patterns of Puritan settlement (i.e., the concentration of residents’ lives 
around one center) and its unraveling. The need to accommodate new 
realities within old ideological precepts is to be credited for the first 
appearance in statute of the term “district” in the educational context, and 
for the legislative recognition of a politically separate local body managing 
186 For example, the Act required an inspection of all schools every six months, regulation of 
student attendance, and certification of all schools. Id. 
187 See SUZZALLO, supra note 131, at 105. Thus, for example, Haverhill immediately established a 
committee. CHASE, supra note 175, at 441. 
188 See Act of June 25, 1789, 1789 Mass. Acts 416. Citing the 1789 Act, Haverhill divided itself 
into districts in 1791. CHASE, supra note 175, at 457. 
189 For example, Haverhill empowered districts to erect and manage their own schools, and further 
subdivide themselves. Id. 
190 E.g., WILLIAM A. EMERSON, HISTORY OF THE TOWN OF DOUGLAS 90–91 (Boston, Frank W. 
Bird 1879). 
191 J.H. TEMPLE, HISTORY OF NORTH BROOKFIELD, MASSACHUSETTS 256 (1887). 
192 See SCHULTZ, supra note 152, at 20; SUZZALLO, supra note 131, at 3–4. 
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schools.193 In the following century this legislative recognition would 
evolve into legislative decree, in Massachusetts—and elsewhere. 
B. The Ascendant School District: Nineteenth-Century Expansion
The school district was invented in colonial times, but it became
America’s default school government during the republic’s first century. At 
Independence, the school district and committee were recognized as 
potential forms of school governance in New England.194 By the nineteenth 
century’s second half, the institution’s grip over educational matters was 
absolute and its reach continental. The century thus witnessed the 
culmination of two processes. First, the district and board were 
consolidated as the sole body governing schools, rather than one of several 
optional bodies. Second, the scheme spread beyond New England to other 
areas which did not face the peculiar colonial conditions that had 
engendered it. The study of these twin processes yields further insights into 
the motivations for American law’s embrace of the school district. 
1. Consolidating the School District in Nineteenth-Century
Massachusetts.—Although the importance of colonial
Massachusetts to the school district’s emergence cannot be exaggerated, 
the importance of the school district as an institution at that time can easily 
be exaggerated. The school committees and districts of the 1789 Act were 
tentative institutions. The Massachusetts law recognized them as options: 
towns could create committees and could subdivide into districts. These 
options accompanied, rather than replaced, the other bodies empowered to 
run the schools: selectmen or town meetings.195 In other words, the school 
district was a government for educational affairs in Massachusetts, but it 
was not the government for educational affairs in Massachusetts. To 
assume that status, the school district had to become mandatory—which it 
did by the 1820s—and then had to displace all other local governments 
from the field of education—which it did by the Civil War.  
a. The school district made mandatory.—As seen in the
preceding Section, in 1789 the state legislature adopted a permissive 
approach towards the school district. Almost immediately thereafter, 
193 Connecticut followed suit in 1798 with an act empowering “School Societies” to elect 
“Committees” and subdivide into school “districts.” Act of May 10, 1798, 1798 Conn. Spec. Acts 481, 
491. 
194 This was only true in Puritan New England: the colonies of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and 
New Hampshire. Non-Puritan Rhode Island did not have a public schools law. 
195 Thus, for years Haverhill’s school committee submitted its regulations to the town meeting for 
approval. CHASE, supra note 175, at 441, 455–57. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
974 
however, it found that approach unsatisfactory, probably due to 
disappointment with towns’ failings to meet schooling obligations. 
Educational conditions only worsened after the 1789 law’s new mandates 
were adopted. The post-revolutionary decades were years of decline for 
Massachusetts’s schools.196 Post-war rebuilding struck taxpayers as more 
pressing.197 The reluctance to pay for schools was exacerbated by 
populations’ continued, war-induced dispersal away from centrally located 
schools. Most towns thus failed to comply with state-ordered obligations to 
operate schools.198  
Since fault was ascribable to towns’ funding priorities, the state 
legislature reacted by shifting some of the financial decisionmaking to 
school districts. An 1800 act empowered “School Districts” to raise funds, 
by taxation, for a school’s construction and maintenance.199 The Act gave 
the town no power to block such initiatives or to access funds raised for 
funding schools. This Act is exceptionally important to the school district’s 
legal history. Due to a desire to assure separate and protected revenue for 
schools, school district finances were, for the first time, isolated from town 
finances and governments. The state legislature would formalize the school 
districts’ separate standing—in all pertinent issues—in an 1817 act 
announcing school districts to be separate bodies politic, empowered to sue 
and be sued.200  
In the following decade, the legislature did even more to entrench the 
politically separate school government. In 1822, it incorporated the City of 
Boston.201 Now that Boston had a separate representative government—an 
elected mayor and council—the original impetus for the school 
committee’s establishment disappeared. Thereupon or soon thereafter, 
other colonial committees set to address specific tasks—fire, health, etc.—
would accordingly be subsumed into the new city administration.202 The 
new representative city government was, after all, put in place precisely to 
fill the gaps in town meeting management that these committees had 
bridged before.  
196 LAWRENCE KOTIN & WILLIAM F. AIKMAN, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPULSORY SCHOOL 
ATTENDANCE 20–24 (1980); SCHULTZ, supra note 152, at 8. This lack of interest in education prevailed 
throughout the nation. CUBBERLEY, supra note 115, at 110–11. 
197 SCHULTZ, supra note 152, at 8. 
198 Id. 
199 Act of Feb. 28, 1800, ch. 66, 1799 Mass. Acts 455. 
200 Act of June 13, 1817, ch. 14, 1817 Mass. Acts 397. 
201 Act of Feb. 23, 1822, ch. 110, 1822 Mass. Acts 734. 
202 HARTWELL ET AL., supra note 133, at 195–96. The Overseers of the Poor were transformed into 
appointed city officials somewhat later, in 1864. 
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In stark contrast, however, the law chartering Boston insisted that the 
separate school committee be maintained.203 In 1827 that command was 
expanded beyond Boston: the legislature mandated that all towns establish 
a separately elected school committee.204 Furthermore, towns containing 
several school districts were obliged to keep separate “prudential 
committees” for each to oversee that district’s school and hire teachers.205  
This 1827 law transformed the school committee from an optional 
governing body into a mandatory one. The immediate reason, as seen here, 
was to assure funding. The move was also permeated, however, by those 
original values spawning Boston’s committee, which made the committee’s 
abolition upon cityhood unthinkable: principles of citizen representation. 
Commenting on the 1827 law decades later, one writer described it as 
“mark[ing] the utmost limit to the subdivision of American sovereignty—
the high-water mark of modern democracy.”206  
b. The school district made supreme.—For practical funding
concerns and ideological democratic commitments, the 1827 Act 
institutionalized the school district we know today—a separate political 
entity. One legal attribute of the modern school district was still missing 
though: exclusivity. All other local governments were yet to be stripped of 
their concurrent powers in the education field. This feat was accomplished 
in the ensuing turbulent decades of the Jacksonian Era, when social shifts 
gave rise to modern ideas about public schooling’s role, and with them, a 
new idea about its governance’s desired nature.  
The school scheme enacted in 1827 was applied to a state that was 
very different, economically and socially, from the state the earlier 1789 
Act had confronted. Manufacturing and commerce had begun their 
unstoppable ascent, and cities were exploding.207 Boston’s population 
almost doubled between 1800 and 1820; then, between 1820 and 1860, it 
quadrupled.208 Many new residents were immigrants: by 1860, a third of the 
203 Act of Feb. 23, 1822, § 19, 1822 Mass. Acts 746. 
204 Act of Mar. 10, 1827, ch. 143, 1827 Mass. Acts 557, 560. 
205 Haverhill immediately abided. CHASE, supra note 175, at 497. 
206 MARTIN, supra note 151, at 92. 
207 Edward L. Glaeser, Reinventing Boston: 1630–2003, 5 J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY 119, 120–22 
(2005). 
208 Richard C. Wade, Foreword, in SCHULTZ, supra note 152, at vii. In 1800, Boston boasted 
24,937 residents; in 1820, 43,298; and in 1860, 177,840. 
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city’s residents were foreign.209 Newcomers were mostly poor and working 
class—products of the new manufacturing-based economy.210 
The city’s elite perceived this new populace as a threat, but believed it 
redeemable.211 Boston’s Brahmins saw the school as a tool that could tackle 
the challenge. Horace Mann, the common school’s founder, proclaimed in 
1841, “the Common School is the greatest discovery ever made . . . . Other 
social organizations are curative and remedial; this is a preventive and an 
antidote . . . .”212 A public school system offered great promise in troubling 
social times. Unfortunately, the existing system Mann and others originally 
encountered in Boston could not have struck them as capable of living up 
to this promise.213 The system was exceptionally disorganized. Specifically, 
it was incapable of assigning students to schools or supervising 
attendance,214 served only a small fraction of the population,215 and left 
teachers with little guidance while instilling outdated skills.216  
To fulfill their envisioned promise in exacting times, the schools had 
to be fixed.217 The fix, reformers reckoned, should derive from the same 
forces generating the new challenges.218 The industrial order had replaced 
home-based, small manufacturing with large, planned, and hierarchical 
factories. The values that had revolutionized industry should, reformers 
believed, be employed to revolutionize antiquated schooling as well.219 
209 Id. 
210 Josiah Quincy, Social Life in Boston, in 4 THE MEMORIAL HISTORY OF BOSTON 13–14 (Justin 
Winsor ed., 1881). 
211 SCHULTZ, supra note 152, at 25. 
212 Horace Mann, Introduction, 3 COMMON SCHOOL J. 1, 15 (1841). 
213 The same was true outside of Boston, as reports received by Mann indicated. Jonathan C. 
Messerli, Localism and State Control in Horace Mann’s Reform of the Common School, 17 AM. Q. 104, 
112–13 (1965). 
214 SCHULTZ, supra note 152, at 105–06. 
215 JOSEPH M. WIGHTMAN, ANNALS OF THE BOSTON PRIMARY SCHOOL COMMITTEE 91 (1860). 
216 JAMES CARTER, LETTERS TO THE HON. WILLIAM PRESCOTT, LL.D., ON THE FREE SCHOOLS OF 
NEW ENGLAND, WITH REMARKS UPON THE PRINCIPLES OF INSTRUCTION 55 (1824). 
217 Mann’s educational worldview drew on his general faith, characteristic of the Whig movement 
of which he formed part, that the rise of technology was not a harbinger of social evils, but that it 
required action by the superior power of the state to supplant the apparent abdication of traditional 
responsibilities by smaller units of authority within the state. Messerli, supra note 213, at 106, 117 n.46. 
218 SCHULTZ, supra note 152, at 106, 116. Their agitation also followed students’ disastrous 
performance in centrally administered tests in May 1845. Id. at 128. 
219 NATHAN BISHOP, FIRST SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
OF THE CITY OF BOSTON 6 (1852) (“[I]n organizing a system of popular education, the same practical 
judgment is to be exercised in making special adaptations of means to ends, as in any manufacturing or 
other business enterprise.”). 
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Planning, order, hierarchy—in one word, centralization—were seen as 
imperative for public schooling’s success.220  
These ideas required abandoning the haphazard way services were 
provided within existing schools, and thus, for example, reformers 
imported the Prussian grade system for dividing children into age-based 
classes.221 But more importantly, the new organizational ideas from 
manufacturing mandated revising school governance. The new factory 
system propagated the conviction that better performance is achieved 
through better management.222 Manufacturing prospered thanks to the 
assembly-line production model. Activists set out to replicate this model 
for schools, imagining the educated child as the end product.223 Assembly 
lines required top-down management: the manufacturing corporation relied 
on an executive board. Accordingly, the reformers concluded that to 
replicate the clean efficiency of the assembly line, school management by a 
compact body of professional managers was necessary. 
By definition, the city’s general—and political—bodies could not 
fulfill this role. They did not consist of professional managers, and were 
premised on broad, open-ended, and inclusive decisionmaking.224 A 
separate body was necessary. The existing school committee was such a 
separate body, containing an executive board’s seeds. But only the seeds. 
The contemporaneous committee’s powers and standing in relation to other 
city bodies, molded to satisfy its post-Independence rationale—political 
representation—was in fact the antithesis of the desired centralized 
governance form.225  
To accommodate the shift in separate school governance’s rationale, 
the committee’s standing within the governing system had to, and did, 
change. The change would generate a school committee of exclusive 
powers in the educational realm.226 Since the reformers’ paramount goal 
220 SCHULTZ, supra note 152, at 142. 
221 HORACE MANN, SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT 21–23 (1844). 
222 A contemporary succinctly noted: “the [free school system’s] influence has not been the 
greatest and best which the same means, under better management, might produce.” James G. Carter, 
Letters on the Free Schools of New England, in 1 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF EDUCATION, No. XI 661 
(1826). 
223 BISHOP, supra note 219, at 8–9. 
224 Boston’s legislature consisted of a Common Council of seventy-five members elected by ward 
and a Board of Aldermen of eight. CHARTER OF THE CITY OF BOSTON AND ORDINANCES MADE AND 
ESTABLISHED (1827). 
225 Presenting a reform plan to the Rhode Island legislature, one Mann disciple explained that 
“civilized men had to decide for the urban poor how to best raise them from barbarism.” HENRY 
BARNARD, REPORT ON THE CONDITION AND IMPROVEMENT OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF RHODE ISLAND 34 
(1846). 
226 SCHULTZ, supra note 152, at 41. 
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was centralization, the committee’s powers were augmented and competing 
power centers weakened. Gradually the committee became the 
decisionmaker in all school affairs. For example, as early as 1818, the 
Boston school committee insisted on appointing a primary school board 
declaredly opposed to the policies of the town meeting.227 Then in 1835, a 
law announced that all educational powers lay with the committee, and 
removed the city’s aldermen from participating in school committee 
deliberations.228 In 1837, the committee proclaimed sole discretion in 
decisions respecting the assignment of students to schools.229 Finally, the 
committee was empowered to appoint a professional superintendent, 
emulating a corporate board appointing an expert foreman.230  
At the break of the Civil War, therefore, Boston had a politically 
independent body governing its schools, as it had had at the Revolution’s 
conclusion.231 But that committee was dissimilar in its functioning—and 
more prominently, in its animating rationale—from its earlier version. 
Originally, the school committee was established as the answer to a dearth 
of representative bodies. Now it was the purveyor of centralized 
management. The new rationale made the committee indispensable even 
after Boston had other representative bodies that could have assumed 
democratic control of schools. Moreover, centralization made an 
independent school board appear crucial everywhere public schooling was 
introduced—irrespective of the question whether other local representative 
governments existed in those places. With this new rationale propelling the 
school committee, the legal institution was well-positioned to pervade an 
ever-expanding nation.  
2. Nationalizing the School District.—Until this point in American
legal history, the school district’s story had been a distinctly New England 
affair. That began to change in the nineteenth century’s middle decades. 
During those decades, the school district, already well ensconced in New 
England thanks to developments just reviewed, spread throughout the 
nation. Previously, other states had not recognized school committees or 
districts. But neither did they recognize public schools.232 Throughout the 
227 Id. at 41. 
228 Act of Apr. 7, 1835, ch. 127, 1835 Mass. Acts 480. 
229 SCHULTZ, supra note 152, at 119. 
230 On the campaign to empower boards to appoint superintendents, see JOSEPH M. CRONIN, THE
CONTROL OF URBAN SCHOOLS: PERSPECTIVE ON THE POWER OF EDUCATIONAL REFORMERS 53–55 
(1973). 
231 See supra notes 164–66 and accompanying text. 
232 CARROLL D. WRIGHT, THE NEW CENTURY BOOK OF FACTS: A HANDBOOK OF READY
REFERENCE 976–78 (1909) (listing public schools’ history in the different states). 
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century, the two progressed hand in hand across the states: wherever public 
education was introduced, a separate body to govern schools emerged.233 
But the universal nature of this end result obscures its diverse roots. The 
following review of the processes through which the school district scheme 
was instituted in different states reveals, in order, four distinct motivations 
for its adoption: imitation, lack of other local governments, political needs 
for community-level decisionmaking, and funding necessities. 
The first, and inarguably decisive, reason for the school district’s 
spread during the nineteenth century was emulation. Although the body 
was originally created due to the special, and parochial, circumstances of 
colonial Puritan New England, by the nineteenth century the district was a 
decades-, if not centuries-old characteristic of the country’s first public 
schooling system.234 Lawmakers thus viewed the school district as essential 
for an education system.  
This attitude clearly reigned in the first non-New England states to 
establish public education. New York and Ohio were both heavily settled 
by New Englanders, whose advocacy led to the enactment in those states, 
in 1812 and 1824, respectively, of school laws replicating Massachusetts’s 
1789 Act.235 The pattern was similar in Midwestern states admitted to the 
Union later, even those with a less marked presence of New Englander 
settlers.236 The Michigan Supreme Court, for example, explicitly identified 
the state’s 1827 public education law as modeled after Massachusetts’s, 
and thus read it as aiming to emulate the New England-style school district 
system.237 
Michigan was also impacted by the second reason responsible for the 
nineteenth-century spread of the school district system: new states’ origins 
233 Even the few states diverging from the Massachusetts scheme relied on school districts. South 
Carolina’s first education law established a state-centric system; yet it still divided the state into 
districts, each managed by local commissioners, who were governor-appointees. 1811 S.C. Acts 27–30. 
Maryland’s early law empowered county courts, which appointed county-level school commissioners. 
The latter, in turn, divided counties into school districts—deemed bodies politic—whose trustees were 
elected. 1825 Md. Laws 130–31, 142. 
234 See supra Sections II.A–B.1. 
235 1812 N.Y. Laws 353, 392, 482, 600–01; 1824 Ohio Laws 36–38. In 1805, Ohio had permitted 
the creation of school districts, 1805 Ohio Laws 69, and in 1820, an optional Massachusetts scheme was 
introduced, 1820 Ohio Laws 51–52. The scheme was made mandatory several years later. 1824 Ohio 
Laws 36–38. 
236 E.g., 1824 Ind. Acts 379–80 (duplicating Ohio’s law). Horace Mann drafted Iowa’s law. DAVID 
TYACK & ELISABETH HANSOT, MANAGERS OF VIRTUE: PUBLIC SCHOOL LEADERSHIP IN AMERICA, 
1820–1980, at 46 (1982). Outside the Midwest, the educational clause in Texas’s Reconstruction era 
constitution, TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. IX, § 3, requiring school districts is representative of New 
England traditions. TEX. VERNON’S ANN. CONST., THE PUBLIC FREE SCHOOLS, art. VII, § 1, at 398–400 
(2007) (interpretive commentary). 
237 Stuart v. Sch. Dist. No. 1 of Vill. of Kalamazoo, 30 Mich. 69, 81–82 (1874). 
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as federal territories. The federal Northwest Ordinance, establishing a legal 
framework for the Union’s first organized territories—the Northwest 
Territory, which included future Michigan—provided that schools “shall 
forever be encouraged” in those lands.238 Stirred by this high-minded 
ideal—and by somewhat less high-minded pecuniary considerations—the 
United States offered to grant Ohio, the first state admitted from the 
Territory, free land for school purposes in every township in exchange for 
Ohio’s agreement not to tax federal lands for five years after their sale 
(thereby rendering those lands more appealing to the federal government’s 
buyers).239 Ohio assented,240 as did all subsequent states carved from federal 
territories.241  
The grants presented the new states with a governance challenge. All 
townships were now in possession of land to fund schools. The land 
required management: it had to be farmed or leased. At a minimum, waste 
had to be prevented. Yet the townships had no schools—or local 
governments—to assume that management task. The solution was to 
import the school committee—even before a school existed or was planned. 
Territories enacted laws empowering settlers to elect school commissioners 
to manage school lands.242 This process was reminiscent of the template set 
back in colonial Boston: the body governing schools emerged since other 
government bodies were absent. Yet the process’s fortuity was even more 
pronounced in the new territories and states. Boston needed a body to 
govern schools since it had schools and was dedicated to schooling; in the 
territories, the governance body was created without schools to govern and 
with little concern for schooling.  
This wavering support for education ironically generated a third cause 
for the attachment to the school district in the nineteenth century: a desire 
to enable community decisionmaking. As seen in Section II.A.1, in Puritan 
New England, statutes forced communities to provide free education. 
Elsewhere, where the population was more religiously diverse, compulsion 
was not politically viable.243 Some communities—often, those with New 
238 Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. III, reprinted in 1 U.S.C. at LIX (2012). 
239 PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 289 (1968). 
240 Act of Mar. 3, 1803, ch. 21, 2 Stat. 225, 225–27. 
241 In other words, all later states other than Maine, Texas, and West Virginia. E.g., Powell v. Bd. 
of Educ., 97 Ill. 375, 380–81 (1881) (describing Illinois’s assent). 
242 1819 Ill. Laws 107 (requiring a county to appoint trustees for school land if the township 
residents agreed); 1816 Ind. Acts 104–05 (requiring county commissioners to appoint a superintendent 
to take charge of school land and allowing residents, once numbering twenty, to elect their own 
commissioners to manage school lands). 
243 See CUBBERLEY, supra note 115, at 212–13. 
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England roots—desired public schooling; others did not.244 The sole way 
for legislatures to appease all communities was to enable each to chart its 
own course,245 an approach particularly appropriate in an era infused with 
Jacksonian ideas of popular self-determination.246 This goal could be 
achieved by separating school governance from general governments. Early 
school acts authorized, but did not force, residents to form a school 
committee.247 Thereby, distinct communities, even when subject to the 
same general government—i.e., county or township—could differ in their 
approach to education.248 Each community within the county or township 
could create its own public schooling system—or choose to refrain from 
creating one. 
The school district was the smallest, and most voluntary, unit of self-
government in the political system. Since the district was thus not required 
to geographically overlap with a general government, it could break down 
existing political boundaries. The average Midwestern township contained 
nine school districts.249 The school district similarly accommodated 
communities straddling political boundaries: parents could form a district 
across township and county lines.250 The scheme was also employed within 
cities, for example, Chicago and Pittsburgh,251 to likewise empower 
individual neighborhoods to decide whether to sustain schools.252 It then 
allowed neighbors to pick teachers reflecting neighborhood ethnicities.253 In 
244 E.g., TYACK & HANSOT, supra note 236, at 51 (describing infighting in Wisconsin); Scott 
Walter, “Awakening the Public Mind”: The Dissemination of the Common School Idea in Indiana, 
1787–1852, in HOOSIER SCHOOLS: PAST AND PRESENT 3 (William J. Reese ed., 1998) (describing 
infighting in Indiana). 
245 Paul Theobald, Country School Curriculum and Governance: The One-Room School 
Experience in the Nineteenth-Century Midwest, 101 AM. J. EDUC. 116, 126 (1993). 
246 DONALD B. COLE, THE PRESIDENCY OF ANDREW JACKSON 276–77 (1993). 
247 E.g., 1838 Iowa Acts 180–81; 1846 Miss. Laws 98; 1828 Mo. Laws 49 (mandating the creation 
of boards, but requiring that a majority of residents within each district approve before the board levies 
a tax to fund its activities). As late as 1874, Illinoisans petitioned for creating a school district for their 
community. Trumbo v. People, 75 Ill. 561, 562–63 (1874). 
248 For example, Ohio’s original law explicitly allowed residents of a “neighborhood” to demand a 
separate district even if the township elected not to have schools. 1820 Ohio Laws 51–53. 
249 WAYNE E. FULLER, THE OLD COUNTRY SCHOOL: THE STORY OF RURAL EDUCATION IN THE
MIDDLE WEST 44 (1982). 
250 Id. 
251 The Pennsylvania Free Public School Act of 1834 established each ward of Pittsburgh a sub-
school district. Chicago originally had five separate school districts, each of which employed teachers, 
levied taxes, and built schools. ELLWOOD P. CUBBERLEY, PUBLIC SCHOOL ADMINISTRATION 5 n.2 
(1922). 
252 See Robert H. Wiebe, The Social Functions of Public Education, 21 AM. Q. 147, 154 (1969) 
(“[A]s long as cities remained a collection of semi-autonomous subdivisions, substantial citizens moved 
to those areas where they could substantially control their schools as they chose.”). 
253 CRONIN, supra note 230, at 57. 
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the cities as in the countryside, the district system emerged, therefore, as a 
powerful tool for small-scale communities to design their own public 
institutions and services and to manage their affairs.  
The fourth and final factor rendering the district scheme appealing in 
the nineteenth century was also grounded in certain communities’ demands 
for education: the school district plan could furnish such communities with 
funding for education. In the nineteenth century’s swelling cities, the 
original funds allocated for schooling quickly grew unsatisfactory,254 and 
parents were saddled with fees.255 Reformers thus campaigned—
successfully—for statutes establishing school boards, separate from major 
cities’ general governments, with independent powers to finance schools 
and compel the raising of funds.256  
The school district further promoted such financing goals once, later 
in the century, commitment to education hardened and states began 
mandating schooling. Legislatures created school boards and tasked them 
with raising funds for schooling—thereby bypassing the era’s languid 
general governments that ran miniscule budgets and hardly raised taxes.257 
This legislative practice was challenged—but courts approved it, and in the 
process explicated the school district’s normative grounding.258 A Utah case 
is illustrative. The plaintiff rail company was taxed by a newly minted 
school district.259 The company’s property was separated from the actual 
school by twenty-five miles of mountainous land impassable in winter.260 
Yet the territorial court found immaterial the company’s inability to enjoy 
the school. Education, the court reasoned, was not merely a “local” or 
254 FULLER, supra note 249, at 28. Mismanagement and resource diversion were responsible for the 
paltry revenues derived from the federal school land grants. George W. Knight, History and 
Management of Federal Land Grants for Education in the Northwest Territory (Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, 
Michigan, Wisconsin), in 1 PAPERS OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION 162–65 (1885). 
255 SAMUEL RANDALL, THE COMMON SCHOOL SYSTEM OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK 32 (1851) 
(detailing that in 1830 parental fees funded $346,807 of the $586,520 paid to New York teachers). 
256 E.g., J.M. KEATING, 1 HISTORY OF THE CITY OF MEMPHIS 417 (1888) (explaining that though 
the City of Memphis retained the taxing power, the Memphis school board was granted the power to 
compel the city to pay for contracts the board entered). 
257 Until the 1830s, localities hardly imposed any taxes, and even after that era, much of their 
revenue was based not on taxation, but on special assessments: charges levied on property owners who 
stood to benefit from the specific local improvement funded (e.g., those abutting a street to be paved). 
Stephen Diamond, The Death and Transfiguration of Benefit Taxation: Special Assessments in 
Nineteenth-Century America, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 201, 201–02 (1983). 
258 Bd. of Comm’rs v. Cty. Comm’rs, 20 Md. 449, 451–59 (1864); Nashville & Chattanooga & St. 
Louis R.R. Co. v. Franklin, 73 Tenn. 707, 712–14 (1880); Kuhn v. Bd. of Educ., 4 W. Va. 499, 511–12 
(1871). 
259 See King v. Utah Cent. R.R. Co., 6 Utah 281, 281 (1889). 
260 See id. at 282. 
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private concern of its consumers.261 It was a public concern, and thus 
establishing a special government to fund it irrespective of the local general 
government’s desires was justified—and necessary.262 
The legal commitment to education was finally, and unquestionably, 
established. So was, by this point, the commitment to the school district. 
Different states might have used distinct, and circuitous, routes to get to the 
school district, but by the century’s second half they all had arrived there.263 
A spate of court decisions in the 1870s and 1880s removed any doubt as to 
the institution’s preeminence. Courts brusquely rejected challenges to the 
system, stating in unambiguous terms that schooling was to be provided by 
separate governments.  
In 1872, the Supreme Court of Ohio explained that the “management 
and control” of schools has been placed “exclusively in the hands of 
directors, trustees, or boards of education.”264 Two years later the Supreme 
Court of Michigan announced: “by law the [school] board had [full control] 
over the schools of the district.”265 The court would “spend no time” 
considering a challenge to the school board’s authority.266 The Supreme 
Court of Louisiana resorted to even more forceful terms: “there can be no 
doubt that . . . the city board of school directors . . . shall have sole and 
exclusive control and regulation of the public schools within the city as 
against the apprehended antagonistic authority over the subject that might 
be set up by the City Council.”267 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Kansas 
clarified that “the board of education of the city of Topeka is a distinct 
corporation from the municipal corporation of the city of Topeka.”268 
Therefore, the city lacked authority to interfere with the board’s powers 
over education: “The fact that [the Board’s] limits or boundaries are the 
same as that of the city of Topeka, makes no difference.”269 The Supreme 
261 See id. at 283. 
262 See id. 
263 Arguably the most serpentine route was taken in places where public education succeeded 
private charity schools. After private corporate charity schools for the indigent grew insufficient, they 
were replaced by public schools for the poor that were then transformed into general public schools. 
Since the original charity organizations were chartered as corporations, the public school districts 
assumed their corporate guise. E.g., 1817 Pa. Laws 124 (incorporating Philadelphia’s schools for the 
poor as “[t]he first school district of the state,” which replaced the private “Philadelphia Society for the 
Free Instruction of Indigent Boys”), followed by 1836 Pa. Laws 625 (transforming the poor school 
districts throughout the state into general districts). 
264 Bd. of Educ. v. Minor, 23 Ohio 211, 241 (1872). 
265 Stuart v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 30 Mich. 69, 85 (1874). 
266 Id. 
267 Third Ward Sch. Dist. v. City Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 23 La. Ann. 152, 158 (1871). 
268 Knowles v. Bd. of Educ., 7 P. 561, 567 (Kan. 1885). 
269 Id. at 566. 
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Court of North Carolina held that the general government—the county—
could not change school districts’ boundaries.270 The Supreme Court of 
North Dakota ruled that the district’s bonds were separate from the 
township’s unless a specific statute provided otherwise,271 and courts in 
Tennessee and Maryland decided that so were the school district’s tax 
funds.272 Under similar reasoning, the Supreme Court of Indiana refused to 
read a city tax exemption as extending to school district taxes.273 A West 
Virginia court summarized by characterizing the township and school 
district as “distinct and independent corporations.”274  
As these court decisions demonstrate, by the nineteenth century’s final 
quarter, the school district’s status in American law, as a politically 
separate entity with secure governing powers, was unassailable. The district 
had been elevated to that position by several factors that were unearthed in 
this Section. Many of these reasons can be written off as happenstance. 
First and foremost, public schools’ founders, observing their New England 
predecessors, simply assumed that only a separate government could 
control public schooling. Additionally, some states turned to the district 
system because they were in need of a body (any body) to govern a 
resource (federal land grants for schools) when no local governing body 
existed. Even the substantive goals the school district was set to advance 
were mostly reactions to contemporary exigencies: a political reality 
demanding community-option-respecting schooling and a funding vacuum 
necessitating a separate revenue stream.  
These reasons all account for the school district’s proliferation. They 
cannot, however, explain its persistence. How did this legal institution 
survive the disappearance of the serendipitous conditions to which it owed 
its ascent? Immediately upon the school district’s continental consolidation, 
as just described, conditions in America changed dramatically. Thus, our 
quandary respecting the school district’s endurance can only be fully 
answered through an exploration of that next chapter of the school district’s 
legal history—during which the original stimuli for its appearance receded.  
270 McCormac v. Comm’rs, 90 N.C. 452, 457–58 (1884). 
271 Coler v. Dwight Sch. Twp., 55 N.W. 587, 591–92 (N.D. 1893). 
272 Bd. of Comm’rs v. Cty. Comm’rs, 20 Md. 449, 463–65 (1864); Nashville & Chattanooga & St. 
Louis R.R. Co. v. Franklin, 73 Tenn. 707, 713 (1880). 
273 City of South Bend v. University of Notre Dame Du Lac, 69 Ind. 344, 347 (1879). 
274 Kuhn v. Bd. of Educ., 4 W. Va. 499, 511 (1871); see also Horton v. Mobile Sch. Comm’rs, 
43 Ala. 598 (1869); Richter v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 149 Ga. 32 (1919); Powell v. Bd. of Educ., 97 Ill. 375 
(1881). 
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C. The Established School District: Progressive Era Reforms
The school district, born in colonial times, became an inveterate
American government body in the century following Independence. During 
those decades, as the school district was expanding in legal stature and 
geographical reach, an alternative system of school administration was 
never even suggested. Thanks to the school district’s esteemed colonial 
provenance coupled with the Mann movement’s centralization credo, an 
unshakeable faith in its indispensability prevailed, as the preceding Section 
highlighted.275  
But the turn of the twentieth century was a period for unsettling most 
such unshakeable faiths and questioning seemingly indispensable 
government bodies. Confronted with unprecedented economic, 
technological, and demographic changes wrought by mass industrialization, 
thinkers, activists, and lawmakers—in what would eventually be christened 
the Progressive Era—found many old principles and institutions 
outdated.276 Reformers poured special scorn upon nineteenth-century 
governments—which they disparaged as ill-equipped and too corrupt to 
rise to the new century’s challenges.277 Thus began a reconsideration of 
government’s role in American life that fostered reforms on all government 
levels.278 The school district, as a government created in response to bygone 
eras’ peculiar demands, appeared especially ripe for such reconsideration.279 
Accordingly, during the Progressive Era, schemes for the school 
district’s overhaul and even replacement were contemplated for the first 
time in American history. Progressives introduced expertise as the value to 
which all institutions must adhere, and they fiercely assailed the school 
district—and its traditional rationales—for its incompatibility with that 
value. Yet all the era’s turmoil would eventually leave the school district 
unscathed; indeed, it would leave it vindicated. Progressives ended up 
viewing the school district not as expertise’s enemy, but as its 
275 See supra Section II.B.2. 
276 See generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 3–22 (1989) (discussing the 
Progressive Era). 
277 SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY 1 (1999) (stating that the 
reform movement was “[c]ast in the framework of a moral struggle between the virtuous ‘people’ and 
the evil ‘interests’”). 
278 E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (providing for senatorial elections); Harry N. Scheiber, 
Foreword: The Direct Ballot and State Constitutionalism, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 787, 790 (1997) (discussing 
the introduction of state-level direct democracy). 
279 S.P. Orth, The Cleveland Plan of School Administration, 19 POL. SCI. Q. 402, 402 (1904) 
(identifying the school district as an inheritance from colonial New England, which “remained in its 
primitive form” unadjusted to the “complex needs of the constantly growing populations in our great 
cities”). 
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embodiment—and thus as superior to other local governments. To fully 
depict the transformation, this Section will first review the challenge posed 
to the legal institution of the school district by the new value of expertise, 
and then turn to its wedding to that value—a reimagination process that 
produced the current, impregnable school district described in Part I.  
1. Expertise-Driven Assault on the School District.—Progressive Era
reforms were reactions to changing American realities.280 They were also, 
however, products of changes in scientific thinking, particularly in the 
social sciences. The social sciences were creatures of the late nineteenth 
century.281 Economics, sociology, psychology, and the political sciences 
were the hallmarks of the new research university.282 Another academic 
field introduced at the time was education: Universities opened the first-
ever education departments.283 In education, as in all research fields, 
contemporary academics’ ambitions expanded beyond scholarly 
advancement.284 The era’s academics believed that through academic 
exploration, solutions could be devised to the problems besetting their 
society.285 Specifically, they were persuaded that furnished with empirical 
data and informed analysis, government could effectively deal with 
industrialization’s challenges.286  
A natural target for such efforts at social bettering through expert 
governing was the local arena.287 Cities were the industrial upheaval’s 
locus: encumbered with unregulated manufacturers, unprecedented density, 
and devastating poverty.288 Moreover, reformers could easily attribute 
280 ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER 1877–1920, at 164–95 (1967). 
281 THOMAS L. HASKELL, THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE: THE AMERICAN
SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION AND THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY CRISIS OF AUTHORITY (1977). 
282 EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM &
THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 15–30 (1973). 
283 The first chair in education was created in 1873; in 1891, eleven college departments existed; in 
1934, five hundred. CUBBERLEY, supra note 115, at 508, 690–91. 
284 For example, Cubberley urged his Stanford colleagues: “the department should strive to have an 
uplifting influence on the schools of California and an ennobling influence on the teachers of the state.” 
JESSE B. SEARS & ADIN D. HENDERSON, CUBBERLEY OF STANFORD AND HIS CONTRIBUTIONS TO 
AMERICAN EDUCATION 57, 111 (1957). 
285 See, e.g., DANIEL T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A PROGRESSIVE 
AGE 98–101 (1998) (discussing economists). 
286 For an exhaustive study of expertise’s rise and its effects on the New Deal, see DOROTHY ROSS,
THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE (1991). Cf. MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF 
PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 137 (1977) (describing how private firms increasingly 
relied on expert decisionmaking, science, and technology as a result of industrialization). 
287 JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 642 (1919) (“There is no denying that the 
government of cities is the one conspicuous failure of the United States.”). 
288 See generally JACOB A. RIIS, HOW THE OTHER HALF LIVES: STUDIES AMONG THE TENEMENTS 
OF NEW YORK (New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons 1890) (famously portraying residents’ plight). 
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cities’ failures in tackling these trials to incompetent governance.289 They 
portrayed local governments as inept and corrupt290 and set out to substitute 
existing structures with expertise-driven replacements.291  
Progressive Era reformers’ battle, under the banner of expert 
government, against local “machine politics” prompted drastic changes in 
American local government law. As others have chronicled, key attributes 
of current law—home rule,292 the ban on special legislation,293 city 
managers,294 zoning,295 and the special district296—date to those efforts. But 
the reformers’ efforts also profoundly affected education’s governance.297 
Dedicated to science, social work, and knowledge’s redeeming virtues, 
progressives emphasized education as a crucial component of their agenda 
for saving the poor, and the nation.298 This celebration of education, 
combined with the abhorrence of machine politics, led reformers to 
intensely campaign to divorce education’s management from politics.299 
The goal, one writer explained, must be “placing the schools beyond the 
reach of the politicians.”300  
289 E.g., LINCOLN STEFFENS, THE SHAME OF THE CITIES 3–18 (1904) (portraying the struggle as 
between “good government” reformers and “commercial politician[s]”). 
290 See, e.g., LINCOLN STEFFENS, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF LINCOLN STEFFENS 422 (1931) 
(“Philadelphia, Corrupt and Contented, . . .  [was not the] worst in the land . . . . It was only older than 
St. Louis and Minneapolis.” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
291 Samuel P. Hays, The Politics of Reform in Municipal Government in the Progressive Era, 
55 PAC. NW. Q. 157, 160 (1964). 
292 See generally David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2257 (2003) 
(describing the Progressive Era efforts to both grant and limit the authorities of local governments in 
order to enable cities to bring about urban reform). 
293 Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 9–10 (1990).
294 See generally HARRY AUBREY TOULMIN, JR., THE CITY MANAGER: A NEW PROFESSION 156–
68 (1915) (describing the rise of and response to the city manager plan as a method of municipal 
reform). 
295 See generally Nadav Shoked, The Reinvention of Ownership: The Embrace of Residential 
Zoning and the Modern Populist Reading of Property, 28 YALE J. REG. 91 (2011) (describing the legal 
adoption of zoning laws at the time). 
296 See generally Shoked, supra note 22, at 1986–87 (describing how progressive New Dealers 
embraced and promoted the special district). 
297 Schools had their own muckraker. See generally JOSEPH M. RICE, THE PUBLIC-SCHOOL SYSTEM
OF THE UNITED STATES (New York, The Century Co. 1893). 
298 CUBBERLEY, supra note 115, at 763–64 (“Education in a democratic government such as ours is 
the greatest of all undertakings for the promotion of the national welfare.”); see also LAWRENCE A. 
CREMIN, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN EDUCATION 6–7 (1965) (highlighting progressives’ determination 
that education was the task of schools—not home or society). 
299 JOHN D. PHILBRICK, U.S. BUREAU OF EDUC., CIRCULARS OF INFORMATION OF THE BUREAU OF
EDUCATION, NO. 1-1885: CITY SCHOOL SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES 14 (1885) (“[A]s is your 
school board, so are your schools.”). 
300 Orth, supra note 279, at 416. 
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Initially, this goal entailed undermining the school district.301 The New 
York Times announced “the best method of proceeding to reform the 
schools . . . is by reforming the whole system of their management.”302 To 
reformers’ dismay, the school district had remained throughout its 
existence an elected, political body.303 Even worse—from the prejudiced 
perspective of these genteel activists—the identity of those elected to serve 
on district boards was changing. Mass immigration had transformed the 
franchise—and the candidates chosen for office.304 Reformers characterized 
board members as at best amateurs,305 and at worst corrupt political hacks 
utilizing the office for patronage or as political stepping stone.306 Such 
inferior officials had to be replaced by experts running the schools to 
everyone’s benefit.307  
Calls were made to weaken the school board by transferring more 
powers to an appointed expert school superintendent.308 These calls were 
sometimes intensified to pleas for the board’s outright abolition.309 
Commentators noted that other specialized city boards were 
disappearing.310 Some thus envisioned the school board’s duties assumed 
by a professional school department within city government.311 Combining 
these two lines of thinking, one major professional organization proposed a 
legislative education board appointed by the city mayor contenting itself 
301 See TYACK & HANSOT, supra note 236, at 204 (noting that liberal reformers “believed in 
granting greater power and autonomy to professional educators”). 
302 Wanted—Money and Brains, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1895, at 4. 
303 DAVID B. TYACK, THE ONE BEST SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN URBAN EDUCATION 130 
(1974) (quoting reformers who explained that the “strong . . . honest and experienced men” needed for 
the government of schools cannot be secured through “unrestricted suffrage”); see also Wiebe, supra 
note 252, at 152 (noting that teachers were playing a subordinate role in education). 
304 E.g., Orth, supra note 279, at 406–07 (describing how “foreign influx” into Cleveland changed 
the city’s “political complexion,” including school administration). 
305 See, e.g., PHILBRICK, supra note 299, at 52, 55 (arguing that school boards are behind the times, 
incompetent, or indifferent to the public interest). 
306 CRONIN, supra note 230, at 64–68. 
307 TYACK & HANSOT, supra note 236, at 107. 
308 E.g., RICE, supra note 297, at 18–19 (suggesting that school boards should appoint 
superintendents with sufficient independent power); William H. Maxwell, Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, Report of 
Committee of Fifteen, 1895 J. PROC. & ADDRESSES, at 232, 234 (listing as issues for discussion the 
responsibilities, authorities, and qualifications of superintendents). 
309 Charles H. Judd, Abolish the School Boards, 15 PUB. MGMT. 321, 321 (1933). 
310 See, e.g., 1 CITY OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON SCHOOL INQUIRY, BOARD OF
ESTIMATE AND APPORTIONMENT 55 (1913) (noting that “[t]he large unwieldy school board is being 
abandoned”). 
311 Charles H. Judd, School Boards as an Obstruction to Good Administration, 13 NATION’S SCHS. 
13, 14–15 (1934). 
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with general policy, leaving decisionmaking to a professional 
superintendent.312  
These proposals conveyed a clear message: the politicized school 
district should lose its primacy in the education field.313 It ought to be 
replaced by a professional agent or body within the city’s bureaucracy. 
Several major cities heeded that message. Most prominently, in 1920, San 
Francisco voters substituted their school board with one appointed by the 
mayor.314 Earlier, in 1905, Houston had already adopted such an appointed 
board.315 As a legal institution, the politically independent district was 
slumping. But not for long. 
2. Expertise-Driven Embrace of the School District.—The
progressive attack on the school district stands out not only for its 
fierceness, but also for its brevity. Experiments with educational systems 
not centered on a politically independent school district were outliers.316 
San Francisco’s move emanated from very peculiar, and parochial, political 
circumstances,317 and even there, residents were, immediately after the 
appointed-board plan was adopted, afforded the right to ratify mayoral 
appointees to the board.318 Houston’s spell as an outlier was short-lived: in 
1923 it reverted to an elected board.319 Elsewhere, reformers’ stated 
hostility towards the existing school district scheme did not translate into 
actual moves to rein in separately elected boards. St. Louis rejected all such 
proposals.320 Buffalo, in the midst of an effort to modernize its school 
system, was urged by authorities on school administration to adopt an 
elected board.321 In New York City and Chicago, mayoral involvement with 
school boards was scathingly criticized.322 
312 Andrew S. Draper, Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, Report of the Sub-Committee on the Organization of City 
School Systems, 1895 J. PROC. & ADDRESSES, at 375, 375–88. 
313 More radical calls demanded that the state replace it. CUBBERLEY, supra note 115, at 746. 
314 Victor L. Shradar, Ethnicity, Religion and Class: Progressive School Reform in San Francisco, 
20 HIST. EDUC. Q. 385, 388–89, 485 (1980). 
315 CRONIN, supra note 230, at 96–97. 
316 See Orth, supra note 279 (failing to produce examples). 
317 Shradar, supra note 314, at 398–99 (showing that the vote to abolish the elected board did not 
trace the usual elite versus working class lines, but rather the local elite were successful since the city’s 
conditions enabled them to form an alliance with the local native-born working classes in opposition to 
the Catholic working class). 
318 CRONIN, supra note 230, at 131–32. 
319 Id. at 132. 
320 Id. at 73. 
321 See BUFFALO MUN. RESEARCH BUREAU, REPORT OF THE BUFFALO SCHOOL SURVEY 22–23 
(1931). 
322 CRONIN, supra note 230, at 133. 
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Reformers were not blind to this poor track record. As early as the 
1930s, commentators were noting the scant headway made by proposals for 
merging school governments with other, general governments.323 The truth 
was, however, that almost from the outset, reformers’ own opposition to 
the politically separate school district dithered.324 The reason was simple: 
the school district may not have been reformers’ ideal expertise-driven 
body for managing schools, but the alternative was even less palatable. 
General governments were progressives’ bêtes noires. “[T]he city 
governments of the United States,” one wrote, “are the worst in 
Christendom.”325 Thus it was not surprising that most reformers balked at 
suggestions that city governments control schools.326 A typical critique of 
these initiatives reiterated reformers’ mantra “that education [was] too 
‘important’ to be a municipal function.”327 Progressives were advocating 
expertise-driven decisionmaking: their concern, unlike that of earlier 
Mann-era reformers, was not simply centralization.328 City government was 
local government’s hub, but it was also the nub of political activity, and 
thus constitutively impervious to expertise-driven decisionmaking.329 
Reformers had for decades focused their efforts on removing powers from 
the city’s purview. The notion that responsibilities should be added to the 
city’s portfolio was anathema.330  
Reformers’ original misgivings gave way: politically independent 
school districts’ merits were reconsidered.331 The school district was similar 
323 See NELSON B. HENRY, SCHOOLS AND CITY GOVERNMENT 2 (1938) (describing how citizens 
were fearful of a “dependent” school system due to the risk of political abuses, such as the misuse of 
school funds). 
324 TYACK, supra note 303, at 145–47 (explaining that despite their strong endorsement of 
administrative control of schools by an expert superintendent, reformers still entertained the endurance 
of the school board as a buffer between the experts and the politicians); see also RAYMOND E. 
CALLAHAN, EDUCATION AND THE CULT OF EFFICIENCY 193–96 (1962) (describing debates among 
reformers about the need for local control over the expert administrator they imagined running the 
schools). 
325 Andrew D. White, The Government of American Cities, FORUM (1890), reprinted in URBAN 
GOVERNMENT 213 (Banfield ed., 1961). 
326 CUBBERLEY, supra note 251, at 96, 104; GEORGE D. STRAYER, EDUC. POLICIES COMM’N, THE
STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION OF EDUCATION IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 59 (1938). 
327 CRONIN, supra note 230, at 140 (citation omitted). 
328 See Charles Francis Adams, Jr., The Development of the Superintendency, 1880 ADDRESSES &
J. PROC. NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, at 61, 64–65 (assailing Mann reformers as “pseudo-intellectual[s],”
obsessed with mindless organization rather than academic expertise).
329 See TYACK & HANSOT, supra note 236, at 108 (contrasting political issues decided by elected 
representatives on central committees with “matters of administrative discretion” decided by experts). 
330 See CRONIN, supra note 230, at 139–43 (describing the controversy surrounding one scholar’s 
campaign to abolish school boards). 
331 TYACK & HANSOT, supra note 236, at 108. Isolated commentators agitated again for board 
abolition during the Depression to save money. CRONIN, supra note 230, at 138. 
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to the special district—a legal institution whose status and similarities to 
the school district were introduced in Section I.B. Reformers were 
enamored with the special district, a supposedly specialized entity that 
drained powers (over housing, water, etc.) from the loathed political city.332 
Like the special district, the school district removed powers over the 
provision of a service (in this case, education) from city hall. The school 
district could thus appeal to reformers.333  
But the school district did not truly replicate the cherished model of 
the special district: true, it removed powers from city hall, but it did not 
place those powers beyond the reach of politics. Unlike most special 
districts, the school district was always elected by the general public—
therefore it was inevitably placed at the midst of the political thicket. To 
serve the new expertise rationale the existing school district thus had to be 
reshaped.334 Several legal moves were accordingly pursued by reformers, 
forming an “organizational revolution” transforming the school district.335   
The revolution’s overarching concern was depoliticizing the school 
district.336 New York’s highest court explained: “If there be one public 
policy well-established in this State it is that public education shall be 
beyond control by municipalities and politics.”337 The general strategy was 
to turn the school district into a broader administrative unit, rendering it 
less “parochial.”338 Thus power was consolidated in the city’s school board 
as ward (i.e., neighborhood) boards set to manage individual schools were 
abolished.339 Next, often prodded by state legislatures, school boards 
switched from ward-based representation to at-large elections,340 allegedly 
producing members not beholden to narrow constituencies, but to the 
people’s general interest.341 Boards were also reduced in size to improve 
members’ quality.342 And in the most celebrated reform, Cleveland attacked 
332 Shoked, supra note 22, at 1986–87. 
333 Orth, supra note 279, at 408. 
334 Id. at 403. 
335 TYACK, supra note 303. See generally WILLIAM A. BULLOUGH, CITIES AND SCHOOLS IN THE 
GILDED AGE (1974). 
336 Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, Secretary’s Minutes, Department of Superintendance, 1892 J. PROC. &
ADDRESSES, at 561, 568. 
337 Divisich v. Marshall, 22 N.E.2d 327, 328 (N.Y. 1939). 
338 CUBBERLEY, supra note 115, at 746. 
339 RAVITCH, supra note 45, at 155. 
340 E.g., CRONIN, supra note 230, at 50 (discussing the rise and fall of ward representation in 
Buffalo, Chicago, and Boston, among other cities). 
341 TOULMIN, supra note 294, at 42. 
342 CUBBERLEY, supra note 251, at 92 (explaining that large boards prioritized political 
grandstanding). 
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the authority of politically accountable school board members.343 It 
removed powers from board members, transferring those powers to an 
executive elected directly.344 The voters were not free to elect whomever 
they fancied, however, for that post; the statute required the executive to 
deposit an exceptionally steep bond,345 thereby assuring that he be among 
the city’s business elite, and “practically eliminat[ing]” politics from the 
schools.346 Pittsburgh went a step further: there, starting in 1911, judges 
appointed school board members.347  
These radical two plans, as well as the more restrained (and common) 
reforms toward consolidation of major cities’ boards, aimed to render the 
school district a conduit for expertise—rather than political expression. 
This transformation in the school district’s normative purpose was perhaps 
even more pronounced in reforms pursued outside cities. Originally, as 
explained in Section II.B.2, rural school districts were created as county 
and township subareas wherever a group of residents desired a school. 
Thus in many states, the countryside was littered with hundreds, if not 
thousands, of miniscule districts, each controlling just one school.348 The 
small, one-room ungraded schools these districts ran struck reformers as 
inadequate for the new century’s demands.349 These school districts’ 
scheme of governance also starkly contradicted reformers’ preference for 
larger units promoting professionalization, sound school finances,350 and 
the “entire elimination of politics” that otherwise dominated small, 
community-controlled governments.351  
Thus began the drive to consolidate rural school districts.352 Some 
states allowed school districts to initiate the process themselves,353 
343 Andrew S. Draper, Plans of Organization for School Purposes in Large Cities, 1894 NAT’L 
EDUC. ASS’N J. PROCEEDINGS & ADDRESSES, at 298, 307 (“[The Cleveland Plan] is radical in its 
innovations. There is nothing else like it in the country. It came from the best and most substantial 
thought of a great city, which has deep interest in its public schools . . . . It is in the direction of, if it 
does not go beyond, what has been advised by the best educational thought of the country.”). 
344 Orth, supra note 279, at 415. 
345 Bond was set at $25,000, while the annual salary was $5,000. Id. 
346 Id. 
347 Act of May 18, 1911, art. II, §§ 201–02, 206, 1911 Pa. Laws 309, 317–18. 
348 Fischel, supra note 45, at 177. 
349 MABEL CARNEY, COUNTRY LIFE AND THE COUNTRY SCHOOL 140–42 (1912). The Commission 
on Country Life appointed by President Roosevelt in 1908 singled out the one-room school as holding 
rural areas back. COUNTRY LIFE COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON COUNTRY LIFE 26–27 
(Sturgis & Walton eds., 1917). 
350 FULLER, supra note 249, at 232. 
351 CUBBERLEY, supra note 115, at 721. 
352 JONATHAN SHER, PUBLIC EDUCATION IN SPARSELY POPULATED AREAS OF THE UNITED STATES 
28–29 (1977). 
353 Act of Mar. 11, 1901, ch. CC, § 1, 1901 Ind. Acts 437, 437. 
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sometimes enticing them with subsidies.354 Other states empowered county 
officials to unilaterally change subcounty school districts’ boundaries.355 
Still other states mandated the process: formally abolishing the district 
system,356 or proclaiming each county one school district.357 By the early 
1900s, all New England states had largely consolidated school districts 
along township lines—achieving almost perfect geographical overlap 
between the school district and the general government.358 Tellingly, in 
1901, the educational system adopted for recently colonized Puerto Rico 
consisted of elected boards governing school districts geographically 
conterminous with existing municipalities.359  
But in many places, particularly in the Midwest, the consolidation 
campaign stalled360—resulting in the lack of geographical overlap between 
school districts and general governments still prevalent today, as described 
in Part I. Local communities fought back against expert-driven 
centralization,361 and statutory reforms were often rescinded within a few 
years.362 Reformers would not relent, however. The eventual compromise 
carried portentous results for American law. Consolidation was to continue, 
but control was ceded to local residents. Local residents were empowered 
to create consolidated school districts as they desired.363 Districts were thus 
to follow lines residents deemed “organic” or corresponding to “natural 
community” boundaries, rather than to general government lines. The 
outcome was enlarged districts—geared towards the new value of 
expertise—but whose boundaries diverged from other governments’ 
boundaries—justified by an appeal to community values, reminiscent of the 
354 Central Rural Schools Act, ch. 55, art. 6-B, 1914 N.Y. Laws 278, amended by Act of Apr. 16, 
1925, ch. 673, § 185, 1925 N.Y. Laws 1118, 1118–19. 
355 Act of Mar. 9, 1907, ch. 329, § 1, 1907 Kan. Sess. Laws 500, 500. 
356 1890 N.D. Laws Chap. 62, sec. 35, in LAWS PASSED AT THE FIRST SESSION OF THE 
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA 183 (1890) (mandating that all townships 
not organized into districts during the territorial period will constitute “school corporation[s]”). 
357 Act of Aug. 19, 1919, art. VIII, sec. V, § 76, 1919 Ga. Laws 288, 320. 
358 HAL S. BARRON, MIXED HARVEST 49–56 (1997). 
359 Act of Jan. 31, 1901, § 13, 1900 P.R. Laws 29, 33. 
360 BARRON, supra note 358, at 75. 
361 E.g., LAWRENCE W. LEVINE, DEFENDER OF THE FAITH 289 (1987) (“A scientific soviet . . . is 
attempting to dictate what shall be taught in our schools . . . .” (quoting William Jennings Bryan)). 
362 E.g., Julian E. Butterworth, The Evolution of Rural School Organization in New York, in YOUR 
SCHOOL DISTRICT 193, 195 (Howard A. Dawson & Floyd W. Reeves eds., 1948) (describing the repeal 
of New York’s 1917 law). 
363 Howard A. Dawson & Floyd W. Reeves, Foreward, in YOUR SCHOOL DISTRICT, supra note
362, at 13. 
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representation and small-scale community decisionmaking values propping 
up the district earlier during the nineteenth century.364  
This concession to older values should not, however, conceal the 
break with the past the progressive reforms managed to accomplish—in the 
countryside as in the cities. In earlier periods, the core of the school 
district’s normative appeal was its closeness to the people. The school 
district’s new expertise-laden justification abhorred that closeness and the 
populist urges it exuded.365 The pioneering social worker Jane Addams 
described the battle over the Chicago school board’s structure as “an 
epitome of the struggle between efficiency and democracy.”366 For many 
reformers, choosing sides was easy: they “believed less in the people and 
more in the possibility of philosopher-kings.”367 Reformers were blunt in 
their denial of democratic precepts: to increase “efficiency” schools should 
“give up the exceedingly democratic idea that all are equal, and that our 
society is devoid of classes.”368  
Thus the import of the Progressive Era’s legal reforms should not be 
downplayed. The reforms themselves may in hindsight appear technical—a 
reduction in the number of school board members and of districts, the 
transfer of powers to executives, and the establishment of a non-
neighborhood-based representation scheme. But through these adjustments, 
the school district’s normative role was transformed.369 To the extent 
possible, the board was distanced from the people: Democracy was 
contained.370 The ease of this transformation was extraordinary. It 
demonstrated the school district’s normative malleability—and durability. 
Through technical reforms those who had been committed to the school 
district’s annihilation in the name of expertise became the district’s leading 
champions—in the name of expertise. The fiercest and most-principled 
364 MARTIN, supra note 151, at 206 (detailing consolidation opponents’ claims). 
365 TYACK & HANSOT, supra note 253, at 107. 
366 JANE ADDAMS, TWENTY YEARS AT HULL HOUSE 335 (12th prtg. 1962). 
367 CRONIN, supra note 230, at 118. 
368 ELLWOOD P. CUBBERLEY, CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF EDUCATION 56–57 (1909); see also 
Andrew Sloane Draper, Education Organization and Administration, in EDUCATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES 9–10 (Nicholas Murray Butler ed., 1900) (asserting that the more centralized township system 
has produced “better schools and schools of more uniform excellence” compared to the district system). 
369 Douglas E. Mitchell, Major Efforts to Improve School Performance, in SHAPING EDUCATION 
POLICY, supra note 109, at 213 (“The Progressive . . . [r]eform movement [was] largely successful in 
separating educational governance systems from those responsible for the rest of local civic policies.”). 
370 See CHARLES DERBER ET AL., POWER IN THE HIGHEST DEGREE: PROFESSIONALS AND THE RISE
OF A NEW MANDARIN ORDER 87–89 (1990) (reviewing the claim that in the new industrial order 
education became a front of class warfare); Wiebe, supra note 252, at 159 (“The modern system, 
despite the democratic claims of its defenders, more obviously served one class of citizens than had its 
predecessor.”). 
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attack on the school district’s separate legal standing mounted until that 
point—or, as the ensuing century would prove, after that point—was not 
only repelled, but converted into a crusade on the school district’s behalf. 
D. Summary: The Normative Values Sustaining the School District
The school governance scheme which emerged from the Progressive
Era—a politically separate government whose limited-sized board manages 
all schools located within geographic boundaries that may not correspond 
to those of a general government—is wholly recognizable. It is the one 
presented in Part I as currently characterizing American law, and thus here 
concludes this Part’s historical story of the manner in which the American 
school district surfaced. An answer can now be synthesized for the question 
driving the effort: Why did American law develop this separate local body 
to govern education?  
First and foremost, the answer is that at relevant times no local 
governing entities existed that could assume that chore. Colonial New 
England towns had to operate schools on a daily basis but had no ongoing 
governments. Later, townships in the territories and nascent states to the 
west had to manage lands granted for school purposes, but, still in early 
development stages, had no governing entities whatsoever. Path 
dependence similarly played a role. Since the first communities to 
introduce public education—the colonial New England towns—governed it 
through districts, later adopters perceived school districts as requisite.  
Nonetheless, some informed institutional design principles were 
apparent at times—even if they were mostly used to sustain the school 
district after it had already appeared. The district was fortified as a bulwark 
of democratic representation in post-Independence New England. 
Relatedly, it was embraced starting in the Jacksonian Era as a tool for 
facilitating self-determination by small-scale communities—a task it had 
also performed earlier in rural Massachusetts. Conversely, the separate 
school district was sometimes urged through a denial of these democratic 
and communitarian values: as proffering centralization (for Mann era 
reformers) and expertise-driven management (for Progressive Era 
reformers). Finally, a politically separate government for schools was at 
times (e.g., post-Independence Massachusetts, the nineteenth century’s 
second half) promoted since it could fence off funding for schools.  
For all these diverse reasons—some based on convenience, others on 
normative calculation—American law created and molded the school 
district from the mid-seventeenth century through the mid-twentieth 
century. These reasons do not, however, necessarily justify its retention 
today. Can the school district still serve its goals, given the economic, 
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political, social, and legal realities of the postwar era? That inquiry 
animates the Article’s next Part.  
III. THE TOLL OF THE SCHOOL DISTRICT
The school district, a legal institution created in the colonies, forged 
on the frontier, and ripened in the Progressive Era, now operates in the 
environment of the twenty-first century. An important contrast between 
current and earlier settings is that now all states recognize general purpose 
local governments that could potentially manage schools: cities and 
counties. Thus, the original and principal justification for the school 
district’s establishment and empowerment—the absence of a local 
alternative—is obsolete.  
The school district is justifiable today only if it outperforms that now-
existing alternative: the general government, especially since in American 
law that government is the default government for other local services. 
Earlier Progressive Era reformers, struggling with the same question 
respecting the school district’s relative merits, eventually deemed it 
superior to the general government. Roughly a century later, that 
conclusion does not necessarily hold.  
Furthermore, an updated comparison of the qualities of the school 
district and those of alternative governments need not be conducted in light 
of only one normative metric, the sole value those reformers cherished—
expertise. Rather, the assessment ought to be eclectic and agnostic: Does 
the school district still serve any of the substantive values ascribed to it 
better than general governments? 
This Part will thus revisit each of the justifications employed in the 
past to establish, or sustain, the school district, to see if any hold water in 
2017. These justifications, as Part II discerned, included democratic 
participation, small-scale community building, efficient school 
management through expertise, and stable school funding. The focus on 
these values is prompted by the school district’s history, but it is warranted 
regardless. For these values run the full gamut of the benefits 
commentators typically associate with local government, which count 
popular participation, efficient provision of public services, and community 
building.371  
Therefore, as this Part’s review will show, in and of itself each of the 
four values to which appeals were made in the past to justify the school 
district still hold much normative allure today. However, as the separate 
treatment of each of these normative values will also reveal, the school 
371 See supra Section II.C. 
111:945 (2017) An American Oddity 
997 
district can no longer nurture any of them better than the general 
government. Modern social, economic, political, and legal changes have 
hampered the institution’s ability to serve the worthwhile values that had 
vindicated it. Some of these values are even, in all likelihood, disserved by 
the school district today.  
A. The Modern School District and Democratic Participation
Since its original induction into state law, in post-Independence
Massachusetts, the school district has repeatedly been justified as a vehicle 
for citizen representation.372 Even those, like Progressive Era reformers, 
who dismissed the value of popular representation in school management, 
recognized the school district’s contribution to democratizing education.373 
An elected school board could empower citizens to express their 
preferences respecting schooling as voters and as candidates for office. Still 
today, this rationale is often cited by commentators and courts extolling the 
school district.374  
This endorsement remains feasible now, even in the presence of 
general governments also composed of elected leadership bodies, because 
the school district enjoys a built-in democratic advantage over those 
governments. When voting in general elections for mayoral or council 
candidates, a resident picks among bundled products: each candidate offers 
a menu of positions on varied issues.375 The resident must vote for one 
candidate, though no candidate can perfectly reflect all her preferences 
across the many diverse fields of local policy.376 The resident therefore 
compromises and settles for a candidate that—while agreeable to her on 
some issues (say, policing and taxation)—does not match all her 
372 See supra notes 157–60, 206 and accompanying text. 
373 See supra notes 334–47 and accompanying text. 
374 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49 (1973); Wright v. Council of 
Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 469 (1972); RONALD W. REBORE, SR., A HANDBOOK FOR SCHOOL BOARD 
MEMBERS 5 (1984) (“School districts are perhaps the most democratically controlled agency of 
government.”); CHARLES EVERAND REEVES, SCHOOL BOARDS 10 (1954) (describing boards as 
“[b]ulwarks of [d]emocracy”); Wong & Farris, supra note 109, at 217 (“An independent local school 
district that is free from general government control is consistent with the American ethos. An 
autonomous school system reflects strongly held public beliefs in democratic, nonpartisan control over 
public education.”). 
375 See ROBERT S. AMDURSKY ET AL., MUNICIPAL DEBT FINANCE LAW 312–13 (2d ed. 2013) 
(describing how voters are “restricted to voting for or against a candidate based on their overall 
performance, rather than expressing their approval or disapproval of discrete decisions”); Saikrishna 
Prakash & John Yoo, Against Interpretive Supremacy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1539, 1546–47 (2005) 
(explaining that elections are an inexact means to discern voter preferences). 
376 Clayton P. Gillette, Direct Democracy and Debt, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 365, 372 
(2004). 
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preferences (say, respecting zoning). When, conversely, the resident votes 
for an official whose responsibilities, and thus platform, are confined to one 
issue—e.g., education for the school board member—she need not 
compromise. The candidate she picks, by definition, shares her preferences 
with respect to that one issue: education.377 In this manner, separate school 
district elections promote educational governance that better reflects 
residents’ views. 
This theory of the school district’s superior democratic effectiveness 
is unquestionably appealing, and it probably offered a fair representation of 
school districts’ democratic functioning up until the Progressive Era.378 
Unfortunately, however, intervening factors have since knocked the school 
district off this democratic pedestal. In reality, for reasons that will be 
explained next, the modern elected school district is, on average, inferior to 
the modern elected general government in producing representatives and 
policies accurately reflecting citizen preferences.  
The key contemporary political trend responsible for the school 
district’s decline as a tool for effectuating representative government is 
consistently low turnout rates for school board elections.379 In modern 
America, voting rates decrease, dramatically, the lower the level of the 
government holding the elections.380 Fewer citizens vote in state elections 
than in federal elections, and fewer still in local elections.381 On this 
smallest level of government, turnout decreases further the more 
specialized the government.382 Thus, on average, turnout at school board 
377 From the Editors: Mayoral Takeovers in Education: A Recipe for Progress or Peril?, 76 HARV.
EDUC. REV. (2006), http://hepg.org/her-home/issues/harvard-educational-review-volume-76-issue-2 
[https://perma.cc/JX4B-MRSR] (“Most citizens do not base their votes for mayor solely on the 
performance of the school system . . . . [S]chool boards [thus] retain one big advantage: They are the 
only mechanism that provides a direct point of entry for citizens—especially parents—to express their 
concerns about education to the very officials who make education policy.”). 
378 At the time, since they were topic-specific and less central to the political patronage system, 
school district elections facilitated principled participation. E.g., NEWLON, supra note 35, at 243. 
Indeed, fierce debates about schools’ role often surrounded board elections, spiking participation. E.g., 
MARGARET LAMBERTS BENDROTH, FUNDAMENTALISTS IN THE CITY 60–64 (2005) (describing how 
Protestant and Catholic groups competed for control over Boston schools in the 1880s). 
379 JOHN SIDES ET AL., CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS 304 (2012). 
380 Charles S. Bullock III, Turnout in Municipal Elections, 9 POL. STUD. REV. 539, 539 (1990). The 
phenomenon is striking also in comparative terms. The postwar gap in turnout rates between national 
elections and local ones is dramatically larger in the United States than it is in Western European 
nations. Robert L. Morlan, Municipal vs. National Election Voter Turnout: Europe and the United 
States, 99 POL. SCI. Q. 457, 462 (1984). 
381 CHARLES M. KNEIER, CITY GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 397–99 (rev. ed. 1947). 
382 Curtis Wood, Voter Turnout in City Elections, 38 URB. AFF. REV. 209, 220–21 (2002); e.g., 
Ann Allen & David N. Plank, School Board Election Structure and Democratic Representation, 
19 EDUC. POL’Y 510, 516 (2005) (finding that turnout in general elections was three times the rate for 
special elections in two cities in 1999). 
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elections is a paltry 18%,383 lower than the already depressed rates prevalent 
at general local elections.384 In most school board elections, researchers 
claim, the central issues are undefined and the candidates’ positions 
unclear.385 Minimal campaigning or public interest is involved.386 The 
boards operate in a nonpartisan environment, which encourages candidates 
to avoid controversial questions.387 Lively public debates are absent even 
where researchers anticipated contentious competitions, for example, when 
evangelicals (expected to promote a controversial creationist agenda) seek 
office.388 Even these candidates tend to avoid such controversial matters in 
their campaigns, and, once elected to serve on the board, in the board’s 
deliberations and policymaking.389 Everywhere, board elections and public 
board meetings materialize as dreary affairs, and school boards proffer little 
opportunity for meaningful participation today.390  
The cause for this low degree of public engagement in the governance 
of a service that still immensely impacts many is debatable. It may be the 
homogenous socioeconomic nature of many present-day school districts;391 
or voters’ sense that in a now nationalized—even globalized—economy 
lower level governments have little effect;392 or the limited media exposure 
of lower office holders;393 or the difficulty voters experience, in a political 
world no longer based on continuous face-to-face interaction, in assessing 
down-ballot candidates’ quality.394  
383 KENNETH K. WONG ET AL., THE EDUCATION MAYOR 6 (2007). 
384 City elections, while also notoriously underrepresentative, tend to register somewhat higher 
turnout. See Wood, supra note 382, at 223 (finding an average turnout rate of 34% across 57 cities). 
385 FREDERICK M. HESS, SPINNING WHEELS 63 (1999). 
386 See Frederick Hess, School House Politics, in BESIEGED, supra note 19, at 235 (noting that 
campaign contributions play a minimal role in school board elections). 
387 HESS, supra note 385, at 65–66. 
388 MELISSA M. DECKMAN, SCHOOL BOARD BATTLES: THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT IN LOCAL POLITICS 
168–69 (2004). 
389 Id. 
390 MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW 388 (3d ed. 1992); see also 
MAEROFF, supra note 48, at 9 (finding that citizens hardly attend board meetings). 
391 J. Eric Oliver, The Effects of Metropolitan Economic Segregation on Local Civic Participation, 
43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 186, 204 (1999) (finding that more economically homogenous cities have lower 
political participation). 
392 Don Martindale, Theory of the City, in NOEL IVERSON, URBANISM AND URBANIZATION: VIEWS,
ASPECTS, AND DIMENSIONS 28 (1984) (explaining that the “social character of contemporary man is 
more shaped by his experience as a national or an ethnic . . . than as a citizen of a city”); H. G. WELLS, 
MANKIND IN THE MAKING 381 (Charles Scribner’s Sons ed., 1916) (“Local politics remain . . . more 
and more in the hands of the dwindling section of people whose interests really are circumscribed by 
the locality. These are usually the small local tradesmen, the local building trade, sometimes a doctor 
and always a solicitor . . . .”). 
393 Wood, supra note 382, at 213. 
394 STEFFENS, supra note 289, at 3 (noting that citizens do not follow local affairs). 
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Regardless of its root, the prevalent voter apathy creates an opening 
for concentrated groups invested in school board elections’ subject matter 
to dominate elections and produce bodies unreflective of majority 
preferences.395 These groups are either entrenched political machines396 
(that treat school boards as employment opportunities and circulate 
candidate slates) or teacher unions (whose members, school employees, are 
heavily interested and thus form the sole permanent organized interest 
group in board elections).397 As dependable and disproportionate suppliers 
of votes and campaign funding, these interest groups hold elected school 
boards’ ears, and thus receive benefits they desire—whether or not those 
benefits are also advantageous to most voters.  
Thus, for example, New Jersey’s state takeover of the Newark School 
District in 1994—marring future efforts to deploy school resources as 
described in the Introduction—was provoked by the gross mismanagement 
and corruption of an elected board heeding unions and political operatives, 
favoring employees over residents and students.398 And Newark is not 
unrepresentative. Everywhere, elected school boards, as data indicates, are 
prone to better represent organized groups’ peculiar preferences than the 
preferences of the majority of residents who do not participate.399  
The upshot is that the current school district is likely to underperform 
the broader general government in providing effective reflection of 
residents’ preferences. The general government enjoys wider powers, and 
its leaders are more visible and can spend more on campaigning. These 
factors contribute to higher rates of participation in local elections for 
general government posts.400 They also generate a more diverse collection 
395 Note, City Government in the State Courts, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1596, 1598–1600 (1965) (noting 
that in part because of voter apathy, “one interest group is often able to impose its conception of the 
community on the entire populace” of a smaller city). 
396 Martindale, supra note 392, at 21–22. 
397 Terry M. Moe, Teacher Unions and School Board Elections, in BESIEGED, supra note 19, at 
256. 
398 RUSSAKOFF, supra note 11, at 19–20. 
399 See SARAH F. ANZIA, TIMING AND TURNOUT: HOW OFF-CYCLE ELECTIONS FAVOR ORGANIZED 
GROUPS 166 (2014) (describing the effectiveness of teachers’ unions at influencing school board 
elections); L. Harmon Zeigler, School Board Research: The Problems and the Prospects, in 
UNDERSTANDING SCHOOL BOARDS 3, 3–5 (Peter J. Cistone ed., 1975) (describing how school boards 
are not responsive to the needs of the public); see also NAT’L SCH. BD. FOUND., LEADERSHIP MATTERS: 
TRANSFORMING URBAN SCHOOL BOARDS 12 (1999) (noting divergent perceptions of school 
performance by school board members and the general public). 
400 Thomas M. Holbrook & Aaron C. Weinschenk, Campaigns, Mobilization, and Turnout in 
Mayoral Elections, 67 POL. RES. Q. 42, 52 (2014) (finding that lower campaign intensity and spending 
result in lower turnout in local elections); see also Neal Caren, Big City, Big Turnout? Electoral 
Participation in American Cities, 1 J. URB. AFF. 31, 31 (2007) (noting that voter turnout may be low in 
local elections in part because “mayors . . . have less powers than other executives”); Zoltan L. Hajnal 
111:945 (2017) An American Oddity 
1001 
of interest groups vying for influence over the general government, 
rendering it harder for any one individual group to capture the general 
government. That government is thus less likely to ignore the preferences 
of a major portion of the electorate—let alone of a majority of the 
electorate. Therefore, the school district’s historical role notwithstanding, it 
can no longer be embraced as an important democratic arena—or even as 
one that necessarily tends to improve on the opportunities for 
representation offered by the general government.  
B. The Modern School District and Small-Scale Community Building
Participation’s demise as a normative value that can justify the school
district’s political separation from the general government does not 
necessarily portend a similar fate for the related interest of small-scale 
community building, on whose allure the district’s foundations were often 
laid, whether in rural colonial Massachusetts or in Jacksonian Era western 
settlements. In fact, even more than participatory ideals, communal notions 
are intrinsically associated with the separate school district. As a distinct 
entity, the school district’s geographical boundaries may deviate from those 
of other governments and align better with “real” communities.401 As seen, 
geographically separate, rural school districts survived Progressive Era 
agitation precisely because countryside communities perceived district 
boundaries as, unlike general government boundaries, overlapping with 
their organic community lines.402 Thus even as community building faded 
into irrelevance for many urban school districts—which grew at the time 
geographically conterminous with cities or counties—it remained not only 
relevant, but also ideologically determinative, elsewhere.403 
As a normative value, community building still holds much—if not 
more—appeal today. The idea of community empowerment through non-
city/county local governments is straightforward. Unlike its earlier 
predecessors—e.g., the colonial town—the modern general government 
& Paul G. Lewis, Municipal Institutions and Voter Turnout in Local Elections, 38 URB. AFF. REV. 645, 
645–46 (2003) (comparing turnout rates for national versus local elections); Albert K. Karnig & B. 
Oliver Walter, Decline in Municipal Voter Turnout: A Function of Changing Structure, 11 AM. POL. Q. 
491, 491–92 (1983) (describing how “citizen apathy, the absence of competition, less money donated to 
campaigns, [and] less glamorous positions and candidates” account for lower turnout in local elections 
compared to presidential elections). 
401 On the distinction between “Gemeinschaft” (community) and “Gesellschaft” (society), see 
ROBERT A. NISBET, THE SOCIOLOGICAL TRADITION 47–48 (1966). 
402 See supra notes 360–64 and accompanying text. 
403 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741 (1974) (“[T]he notion that school district lines may be 
casually ignored or treated as a mere administrative convenience is contrary to the history of public 
education in our country . . . .”). 
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does not permit face-to-face interactions between all members as is 
believed necessary for true community life.404 Size is to blame: the modern 
general government covers too large a territory and population.405 
Moreover, it is not organized around one specific institution (like the old 
church, town hall, or grazing commons) that all residents frequent and 
where they must all interact.406  
Because the schoolhouse is such an institution—students and parents 
all inevitably interact there—the school district has traditionally offered an 
appealing, community-based alternative to standard general governments.407 
The promise is premised on a tie that the separate school district offers 
between the individual school—in which all members are personally 
invested—and school governance—which consequently forces those 
members to meet and actively cooperate in decisionmaking.408 Though that 
tie dissipated in urban centers with the abolition of ward- or neighborhood-
based representation during the Progressive Era, it lived on in rural areas 
where, alongside the one-room school,409 the one-school school district 
dominated.410  
The problem today is, however, that time did not stand still, even in 
the countryside. The middle decades of the twentieth century witnessed a 
precipitous decline in the number of one-room schools, and accordingly, of 
rural school districts.411 Researchers debate whether rural school district 
consolidation was pressed on local communities by external, state-based 
404 HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 269–73 (2006); RICHARD SENNETT, THE USES OF 
DISORDER 163–71 (1970). 
405 Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE L.J. 75, 84–89 (1998). 
406 See RICHARD SENNETT, THE FALL OF PUBLIC MAN 17 (1977) (describing the demise of 
common spaces where city residents might interact). 
407 See SENNETT, supra note 404, at 190–93 (identifying the school as a place where people of 
different backgrounds and interests reconcile their views). Thomas Jefferson thus suggested that 
Virginia be divided into smaller political units, “wards,” each centered around one school. JACK 
CRITTENDEN, DEMOCRACY’S MIDWIFE: AN EDUCATION IN DELIBERATION 20 (2002). 
408 See Aaron J. Saiger, The School District Boundary Problem, 42 URB. LAW. 495, 519–20 (2010) 
(describing how, in contrast to other units of local government, school districts are “more likely to be 
genuine ‘functional communities’” due to the high degree of parent involvement (quoting James S. 
Coleman, Schools and the Communities They Serve, 66 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 527, 529 (1985))). 
409 FULLER, supra note 249, at 7 (explaining that the one-room school enabled interaction and thus 
community building). 
410 See supra note 348 and accompanying text. 
411 WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, MAKING THE GRADE: THE ECONOMIC EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN
SCHOOL DISTRICTS 5–6 (2009) (explaining that the decline in the number of school districts is owed to 
consolidation of rural one-room schools); Christopher Berry, School Consolidation and Inequality, 
9 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EDUC. POL’Y 49, 49 (2007) (noting that between 1930 and 1970, 90% of 
school districts were eliminated through consolidation). 
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centralizing pressures,412 or was organically pursued by local communities 
desirous for standardized educational modes necessary in the new 
nationalized economy.413 The outcome, however, is unquestionable. Today, 
even if its geographical boundaries misalign with the general 
government’s, the school district tends to encompass more than one school. 
Its diverging boundaries no longer mark “genuine” community spaces 
centered on a specific school and facilitating community empowerment.414  
An example is provided by the Introduction’s East Ramapo Central 
School District, whose boundaries bring together communities sharing 
exceptionally little and whose members never interact in any school.415 East 
Ramapo’s case is unquestionably extreme, but every school district 
nowadays is a rather large bureaucratic entity like all other governments.416 
It thus can mostly do little to promote the traditional value of small-scale 
community building historically associated with it.417 
While the separate school district, therefore, probably no longer 
promises to stimulate interaction among community members better than 
the general government, it definitely can, and does, effectively perform 
today another community building function: exclusion of outsiders.418 Two 
1970s Supreme Court decisions transformed the school district’s 
geographic separation from the general government into an exclusionary 
weapon. In 1973, the Court ruled that the boundary separating two school 
districts—even those, as in that case, located within one city—may block 
tax funds’ redistribution from the rich to the poor district.419 One year later, 
it held that such boundaries could also inhibit student integration between 
the white and black school districts.420 In tandem, these decisions 
412 Berry, supra note 411, at 53–54. 
413 FISCHEL, supra note 411, at 101. 
414 See David Strang, The Administrative Transformation of American Education: School District 
Consolidation, 1938–1980, 32 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 352, 352 (1987). 
415 Acknowledging the reality that general governments may more closely coincide with 
community lines than school districts do, Utah creates an easy route for cities within a district to secede 
and create a smaller district conterminous with their boundaries. UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-2-118 
(2017); see also City of Herriman v. Bell, 590 F.3d 1176, 1194 (10th Cir. 2010) (explaining the 
rationales for Utah’s law). 
416 See Berry, supra note 411, at 49; Strang, supra note 414, at 355. 
417 CRONIN, supra note 230, at 6 (arguing that by the 1970s, a consensus emerged that school 
boards were detached from actual communities). 
418 See IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 246 (1990); Daniel Kiel, 
The Enduring Power of Milliken’s Fences, 45 URB. LAW. 137, 144 (2013); Erika K. Wilson, Toward a 
Theory of Equitable Federated Regionalism in Public Education, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1416, 1420 (2014). 
419 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 11–17 (1973). 
420 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741–45 (1974). 
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barricaded school district boundaries, and assured their status as tools for 
excluding other community members—those who are poor and minority.421 
Recent events in Omaha provide stark illustration of this form of 
community building that separate school district geographic lines currently 
effectuate.422 Omaha’s municipal lines do not correspond to the 
geographical boundaries of any one school district. Instead, the city is 
dissected by several districts, some established specifically to fight 
absorption into the Omaha Public School District (OPS) covering the inner 
city.423 In 2005, a struggling OPS—of whose students 70% are minority and 
a larger portion poor—turned to a statute dating to 1891,424 which 
empowered the district to annex all other school districts situated within the 
city’s municipal boundaries.425 The effort, dubbed “One City, One School 
District,” provoked intense opposition from the targeted, and affluent, 
separate school districts that lobbied for state reprieve.426 The first 
legislative response would have dissolved OPS into smaller school districts 
corresponding to alleged community lines.427 Not coincidentally, the three 
suggested community-based school districts were racially identifiable.428 
Following national uproar,429 the plan was scrapped.430 But affluent 
communities’ demands would not go unattended, and the state legislature 
did strip OPS of its annexation powers.431  
The Nebraska legislature’s insistence on preserving separate school 
districts within one city exemplifies the type of power separate school 
421 Wayne Batchis, Urban Sprawl and the Constitution: Educational Inequality as an Impetus to 
Low Density Living, 42 URB. LAW. 95, 98 (2010); Saiger, supra note 408, at 495. 
422 Batchis, supra note 421, at 98 (summarizing a study’s findings showing that areas with small 
school districts and increased school district fragmentation were likely to have high levels of school 
racial segregation). 
423 For example, Westside was established in 1947 by white affluent neighborhoods who 
immediately demanded—and received—a special exemption from OPS’s annexation power. Chris 
Burbach, ‘70s Decisions Haunt OPS, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Nov. 28, 2005, at 1A. 
424 NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-409 (2016). 
425 See Complaint at 36, NAACP v. Heineman, No. 8:06-cv-00371 (D. Neb. May 16, 2006). 
426 JENNIFER JELLISON HOLME ET AL., CHARLES HAMILTON HOUS. INST. FOR RACE & JUSTICE,
USING REGIONAL COALITIONS TO ADDRESS SOCIOECONOMIC ISOLATION: A CASE STUDY OF THE 
OMAHA METROPOLITAN 5–6 (2009), http://gs4a.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Holme-Using-
Regional-Coalitions.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HZ6-H8B5]. 
427 A.M. 3142 to L.B. 1024, 99th Leg. (Neb. 2006). 
428 Given city demographics, one district was to contain primarily white students, while the others 
served minority residents. HOLME ET AL., supra note 426, at 7–8. 
429 Sam Dillon, Law to Segregate Omaha Schools Divides Nebraska, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2006, at 
A9. 
430 L.B. 641, 100th Leg. (Neb. 2007). 
431 Id. 
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districts currently bestow on communities.432 Separate districts today may 
limit interactions with, and therefore responsibility towards, other city or 
county residents of different socioeconomic identity.433 This is precisely the 
form of community building many commentators deplore as perverse—
since while allegedly reinforcing internal cohesion, it limits interactions 
with other individuals, community building’s supposed goal.434   
Separate school districts today cannot, as already seen, stimulate such 
meaningful interactions, even within their boundaries—their traditional, 
and beneficial, community-building function—since those boundaries are 
mostly detached from individual schools.435 The twenty-first-century school 
district is just as unfit as other traditional governments—cities and 
counties—for face-to-face communal interaction through governance.436 At 
the same time, and even more than those general governments, school 
districts are fit for contemporary attempts to deflect any chance of such 
432 Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1274 (Conn. 1996) (arguing that district lines are “the single 
most important factor contributing to the present concentration of racial and ethnic minorities in the 
Hartford public school system”). The Supreme Court has accordingly held that district lines cannot be 
drawn in a manner that will perpetuate segregation. Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 462 
(1972). Another example is Memphis: after the formation of a countywide school district, white, 
middle-class communities seceded to form separate districts. Susan Eaton, How a ‘New Secessionist’ 
Movement Is Threatening to Worsen School Segregation and Widen Inequalities, NATION (May 15, 
2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/how-new-secessionist-movement-threatening-worsen-school-
segregation-and-widen-inequal/ [https://perma.cc/MQC2-4GYX]. For a discussion of the earlier 
formation of the countywide district, see Michelle Wilde Anderson, Making a Regional School District: 
Memphis City Schools Dissolves into Its Suburbs, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 47 (2012). A similar 
scenario is currently unfolding in Jefferson County, Alabama. The mostly white suburb of Gardendale 
is seeking to secede from the countywide school district and form its own district, a move contested in 
federal courts for its potential to reestablish segregation. See generally Plaintiffs’ Corrected Objection 
to Motion to Operate Municipal School System, Stout v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 2:65-CV-
00396-MHH (N.D. Ala. Aug. 29, 2016). The district court reluctantly approved the separation, despite 
the fact that the judge was persuaded that “race was a motivating factor in Gardendale’s decision to 
separate from the Jefferson County public school system.” Stout v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 
2:65-CV-00396-MHH, 2017 WL 1488349, at *56 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 24, 2017), supplemented by, 2017 
WL 1857324 (N.D. Ala. May 9, 2017). 
433 Kiel, supra note 418, at 144. 
434 E.g., GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS
140 (1999) (rejecting as a “romanticized sense of togetherness” community building that stresses 
homogeneity); YOUNG, supra note 418, at 226–27 (arguing that “city life” is “an openness to 
unassimilated otherness”). A somewhat more neutral portrayal of the distinction separates bridging 
social capital—which is outward looking—from bonding social capital—which is inward looking.  
ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 22 
(2000). 
435 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 794–95 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Bd. of 
Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vil. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (banning the creation of a school 
district accommodating a religious community). 
436 See Mass. Fed’n of Teachers v. Sch. Comm. of Chelsea, 564 N.E.2d 1027 (Mass. 1991) 
(discussing parents’ and students’ claim that a district is too broad an entity to represent them). 
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interaction with community members who are different.437 Whether this 
common impact is perceived as a disadvantage or not, the school district is 
simply unlikely to offer an advantage over the general government in terms 
of community building in 2017. 
C. The Modern School District and Expertise
As Part II highlighted, throughout the school district’s long American 
story, its normative raison d’être oscillated between two diametrical poles: 
democracy (i.e., participation and relatedly small-scale community 
building) and efficiency (expertise and relatedly stable funding isolated 
from popular pressures). As the preceding Sections illustrated, a gulf now 
separates the school district from the values of participation and small-scale 
community building. This widening gap should bring the district closer to 
the opposite ideal of efficient provision of education through expertise-
driven governance.  
That ideal continues to have normative salience. A plethora of modern 
studies show that effective education determines a child’s prospects, and 
thus national welfare.438 A clear majority of commentators also agree that 
for effective education, specialized knowledge is key.439 Professionalizing 
educational services, accordingly, tends to be a rallying cry for activists of 
diverse ideological persuasions.440 
A separate entity responsible for governing schools has traditionally 
served such desired expertise-driven public education by removing power 
over the field from political—and inherently lay—governments.441 Hence, 
as Section II.C.2 highlighted, Progressive Era reformers grudgingly 
embraced the school district once they had inched its operational mode 
437 Briffault, supra note 36, at 441–42 (“[T]his results in a local politics aimed at the maintenance 
of class and ethnic homogeneity . . . the insistence on separate suburban school districts reflects a 
determination to shield local children from exposure to economic, social and cultural differences that 
are perceived as a threat to family values.”). 
438 MCKINSEY & CO., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE ACHIEVEMENT GAP IN AMERICA’S SCHOOLS 
17–20 (2009); NAT’L COMM’N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., supra note 40, at 15. 
439 See Steven G. Rivkin et al., Teachers, Schools, and Academic Achievement, 73 ECONOMETRICA 
417, 419 (2005) (identifying the impact of teachers and high-quality instruction on student 
achievement). 
440 See, e.g., BENJAMIN MICHAEL SUPERFINE, THE COURTS AND STANDARDS-BASED EDUCATION 
REFORM 21–60 (2008) (describing the adoption and growth of education standards through the late 
2000s); Press Release, Nat’l All. for Pub. Charter Sch., U.S. Education Secretary Arne Duncan Urges 
Public Charter School Supporters to Demand Quality; Children’s Defense Fund Leader Agrees Charter 
Sector Must Hold Itself Accountable for Student Success (June 22, 2011). 
441 An example of contemporary attachment to this goal is the popularity of charter schools, which, 
freed from direct governmental control, are supposedly managed like businesses. Robert A. Garda, Jr., 
Culture Clash: Special Education in Charter Schools, 90 N.C. L. REV. 655, 663 (2012). 
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closer to that of the special district. A key way in which the special 
district’s legal architecture, unlike that of the general government, could 
prioritize expertise was, and is, by legitimizing governance schemes not 
based on equal representation, but on the different stakes held by citizens in 
the relevant governmental service.442 Those citizens that are more impacted 
by the special district’s policies (for example, farmers relying on a water 
district’s services) are supposedly likelier to make informed decisions and 
elect knowledgeable officials, and hence only they are granted the 
franchise.443 So as to promote such informed decisionmaking in the 
educational sphere, this logic of the special district thus demanded that a 
school board’s election scheme favor parents, and perhaps taxpayers.444 In 
this fashion the school district would be superior to general governments—
which hold general, politicized elections—in furthering expert leadership. 
But Progressive Era reformers’ aspirations for applying the special 
district’s governance template to the school district notwithstanding, the 
current school district does not favor the more impacted voters or their 
supposed educational expertise and investment in schools’ management. 
Indeed, as Section I.B. noted, the school district is legally barred from 
doing so. Modern law does not consider the school district to be a typical 
special district; instead it now subjects the school district to many of the 
rules applicable to general governments—particularly those safeguarding 
popular political representation.  
Specifically, when New York employed the expertise rationale to 
defend a school board election scheme confining the vote to students’ 
parents, property taxpayers, and their spouses, the Supreme Court would 
not accept the rationale.445 The Court clarified that regardless of the 
argument’s soundness, the school district was subject to the one person, 
one vote rule.446 No resident may be excluded from voting—even if an 
inclusive franchise renders experts’ election unlikely. In this regard, in 
current American law, the school district is the equivalent of the general 
442 E.g., Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 370 (1981). 
443 E.g., Briffault, supra note 80, at 365. 
444 See Doremus v. Bd. of Educ. of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429, 435 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that “[t]here is no group more interested in the operation and management of the public 
schools than the taxpayers who support them and the parents whose children attend them”). Arguably, 
taxpayers, even if they do not rely on the schools, have a strong incentive—generated by schools’ effect 
on property values—to be concerned with the state of schools. Clayton P. Gillette, Courts, Covenants, 
and Communities, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1375, 1392 (1994). 
445 Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 630–32 (1969). 
446 Id. at 628–29 (explaining that once the school district is made an elected body the one person, 
one vote rule is to be applied—regardless of the district’s lack of general governmental powers). 
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government, not of the special government.447 Relatedly or not, school 
boards today are mostly constituted not of experts, but of amateurs elected 
by an uninformed electorate: “in a school board election, there are twelve 
people up and it’s like throwing six darts at a board, and the six people hit 
win the election.”448 Given the dictates of current law, the Progressive Era 
goal of insulating board management from political forces inherent to 
general elections is by and large unattainable.449 
Accordingly, unlike their predecessors whose work was reviewed in 
Section II.C, modern writers celebrating the school district’s promotion of 
efficient education normally do not cite its supposed promise of apolitical 
management. Rather, they highlight the competition between public 
providers that the school district’s existence generates, and said 
competition’s power to assure the provision of education of the quality and 
quantity that residents desire.450 This idea is familiar to any student of local 
government law. It draws on the highly influential Tiebout Model: local 
governments promote efficiency in the supply of public goods since they 
compete among themselves for residents.451 To attract residents, they adjust 
their behavior and the products they proffer to the preferences of 
residents—in a similar manner to private providers of a good (say cars or 
private schools).452 Therefore, the proliferation of options—of providers of 
public education—intensifies competition and increases the likelihood that 
447 See Briffault, supra note 80, at 353–56. 
448 HESS, supra note 385, at 63. Board members cannot be assumed to be better education experts 
than general government officials. They have little opportunity to acquire special expertise: they are 
elected for specified terms, and, since in most cases they are unpaid, they almost always have other 
jobs. See Jacqueline P. Danzberger, Governing the Nation’s Schools: The Case for Restructuring Local 
School Boards, 75 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 367, 369 (1994) (listing criticisms of school boards); Samantha 
Sell, Running an Effective School District: School Boards in the 21st Century, 186 J. EDUC. 71, 74–75 
(2005) (detailing the arguments against the effectiveness of school boards in the provision of efficient 
education); FREDERICK M. HESS, NAT’L SCH. BDS. ASS’N, SCHOOL BOARDS AT THE DAWN OF THE 21ST 
CENTURY 4 (2002), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED469432.pdf [https://perma.cc/QR5B-GH5J] 
(finding that the vast majority of board members are unpaid). 
449 See Fumarolo v. Chi. Bd. of Educ., 566 N.E.2d 1283, 1309 (Ill. 1990) (foreclosing, at least in 
the context of elections for the body actually governing the schools, the possibility of elections by 
parents alone—a scheme seemingly even more narrowly tailored to align representation with actual 
voter interest and knowledge). Furthermore, in many states, the Progressive Era ideal of appointive—
rather than elective—boards is similarly out of reach. Several constitutions provide that school boards 
be elected, in stark contrast to the boards of special districts. E.g., GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 5, ¶ II; LA. 
CONST. art. VIII, § 9; COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 15. 
450 See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Opting Out of Public Provision, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1185, 1202 
(1996) (“[C]ompetition . . . obligates the government provider to be attentive to the demands of its 
constituents.”). For a forceful critique of this conception of education as a consumption good, see 
Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23 (1998). 
451 Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418 (1956). 
452 Id. at 422–24. 
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a resident will find the school district providing services meeting her 
preferences respecting the quantity, quality, and pricing (embodied in 
taxes) of public education.453 Some commentators find empirical backing 
for this prediction and conclude that a larger number of individual school 
districts in a given area increases schooling’s quality and parents’ 
satisfaction with it.454 Others hotly contest the finding.455  
Importantly, however, this debate revolves around the effect of the 
number of governments within a metropolitan area providing educational 
services, not necessarily around the effect of those governments’ identity. 
In other words, these works ask whether a large number of governments 
providing schooling increases efficiency; they do not ask whether 
efficiency is increased if those governments whose numbers are enlarged 
are separate, as opposed to general, governments. Since, as seen in Part I, 
there are hardly any general governments providing education in America 
today, it is perhaps impossible to produce a meaningful empirical answer to 
this latter question, the one that is of concern to this Article. A sound 
comparison between the performance of schools controlled by general 
governments and by school districts may simply be unfeasible.456 
Theoretical predictions can be made in both directions.457 Since 
453 See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Suburbs as Exit, Suburbs as Entrance, 106 MICH. L. REV. 277, 297 
(2007); Clayton P. Gillette, Local Redistribution, Living Wage Ordinances, and Judicial Intervention, 
101 NW. U. L. REV. 1057, 1072 (2007); Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ 
Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1493 (1987) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE 
FOUNDERS’ DESIGN (1987) and detailing the advantages of decentralized decisionmaking). 
454 Caroline M. Hoxby, Does Competition Among Public Schools Benefit Students and Taxpayers?, 
90 AM. ECON. REV. 1209, 1236–37 (2000). 
455 Jesse Rothstein, Does Competition Among Public Schools Benefit Students and Taxpayers? 
Comment, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 2026, 2036–37 (2007). 
456 Some researchers have attempted to assess the efficiency gains attained through mayoral 
takeover of school districts (these reforms will be discussed in Part IV). They claim to find gains, e.g., 
Kenneth K. Wong, Does Mayoral Control Improve Performance in Urban Districts?, in WHEN 
MAYORS TAKE CHARGE: SCHOOL GOVERNANCE IN THE CITY 64, 79 (Joseph P. Viteritti ed., 2009), but 
given the small and skewed sample size, these analyses are at best anecdotal. Furthermore, other 
researchers provide contradicting data points. Mayoral Takeovers in Education, supra note 377 
(describing the struggles of mayor-controlled districts in Boston and Chicago to maintain student 
achievements that earlier researchers had celebrated). 
457 In places where the district does not geographically overlap with the general government (and 
only in such places), it may enable residents to pick districts separately from their pick of a general 
government. Thus, residents can move within the same general government guided in that move solely 
by their preference for schooling (rather than the preference for other services, like policing, that are 
held constant between the different sites since they are provided by the same general government 
reigning over both school systems). The school district thus unbundles the complex product that is the 
house. See Lee Anne Fennell, Contracting Communities, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 829, 873–75 (introducing 
the idea of the house as a bundled product). At the same time, whether or not the district and general 
government geographically overlap, a variety of governments ruling the same area taxes potential 
residents’ ability to gather and process information about a potential housing destination, and thereby 
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commentators refuse to assume that school district boundaries, as 
compared to the boundaries of general governments, are inherently a better 
fit for the provision of education (correctly, as the haphazard history of the 
district showed),458 separate school districts’ contribution to efficient local 
competition is, at best, indeterminate. 
The current argument made on behalf of school districts’ efficiency—
their promotion of interlocal competition—is therefore in actuality an 
argument for fragmentation and local government control of schools 
generally, not specifically for separate school governance.459 The historical 
argument for separate school governance’s efficiency did specifically 
highlight these separate governments’ superiority to general governments, 
by citing school district management’s insulation from political 
pressures.460 That argument, however, is no longer applicable due to 
twentieth-century legal rulings vindicating general voting rights in school 
district elections. Modern law has thereby placed the school district on 
equal footing with general governments respecting the capacity to promote 
efficient management. Consequently, the contemporary independent school 
district can hardly be said to be necessary for the promotion of efficient 
education. 
D. The Modern School District and Stable Funding
Regardless of its (in)ability to deliver on the normative values 
typically associated with local government—participation, community 
decreases the accuracy of the signals sent by their locational choices. If, when moving, a resident needs 
to only collect information about one government, she is likelier to make an accurate decision, as 
compared to when she needs to gather that same information respecting a plethora of governments, each 
responsible for a different service. Shoked, supra note 25, at 1356. 
458 If school districts’ coverage areas aspired to represent ideal areas for education provision, they 
would have clearly offered the potential of gains in productive efficiency. Gillette, supra note 444, at 
1388. However, the Progressive Era claim that district boundaries were not set for this goal is 
commonly still followed. As Part II has shown, these boundaries are understood as set with other 
concerns in mind. See Briffault, supra note 36, at 384–85 (explaining that school district boundaries are 
associated with ideas of parental control and local community). To the extent commentators believe that 
these boundaries were once guided by ideas respecting the ideal geographical scope of a school 
government, they also assert that those ideas are no longer relevant. See Hoxby, supra note 454, at 1216 
(assuming that school district lines correspond to streams located within a county since originally those 
offered natural barriers—even though modern forms of student transportation easily overcome them). It 
should also be noted that it is unclear what should be the desired, optimal size of school districts. 
Research has tried to address the optimal size of individual schools (centering on the effectiveness of 
smaller schools), but the question respecting the optimal size of the entity managing the schools is 
distinct. See Shoked, supra note 25, at 1370. 
459 Roger B. Parks & Ronald J. Oakerson, Comparative Metropolitan Organization: Service 
Production and Governance Structures in St. Louis (MO) and Allegheny County (PA), 23 PUBLIUS 19, 
28–29 (1993). 
460 See supra Section II.C.2. 
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building, and expertise—the school district, as a separate political entity, 
might provide a more practical benefit: stable school funding. The latter 
can be viewed as a component, alongside expertise, in promoting 
efficiency: the provision of effective education to the nation’s youth. As 
Part II illustrated, past legislators often held this view when empowering 
school districts. The post-Independence Massachusetts legislature provided 
taxing powers to school districts in order to combat towns’ financial 
neglect of schools.461 Similar later acts were adopted in response to parents’ 
angst over student fees.462 These moves reflected a state-level judgment that 
education carried wide-ranging benefits—in modern economic parlance, 
positive externalities—not registered by existing local governments, which 
underinvested in education relative to its true social value.463 States 
searched for tools to subsidize education’s provision so that it fully 
produced its positive externalities. They settled on a separate government 
with an independent, dedicated revenue stream.  
As in those earlier times, schools today are also struggling with 
devastating financial shortfalls,464 and tools propping up their standing are 
still in high demand.465 Unfortunately, the school district is no longer such a 
tool. Due to a century’s worth of financial and legal developments, a school 
district’s political independence is now irrelevant to the task of easing 
schools’ financial crises. Indeed, it might at certain times intensify those 
crises.  
To a great extent, the school district’s historical potential to reinforce 
school financing was born of specific historical circumstances, rather than a 
quality innate to the institution. As noted, in the nineteenth century an 
autonomous revenue source for schools had to be identified, since, beyond 
drying up receipts from federal land grants, schools received no funding 
from upper level governments.  
By the mid-twentieth century however, the necessity of a distinct local 
school funding mechanism was waning fast: the state was assuming an 
461 See supra notes 198–200 and accompanying text. 
462 See supra notes 255–56 and accompanying text. 
463 See, e.g., Barbara L. Wolfe & Robert H. Haveman, Social and Nonmarket Benefits from 
Education in an Advanced Economy, in EDUCATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 97, 118–19 (Yolanda K. 
Kodrzycki ed., 2002) (discussing positive externalities associated with an additional year of schooling). 
464 Kristi L. Bowman, Before School Districts Go Broke: A Proposal for Federal Reform, 79 U.
CIN. L. REV. 895, 904 (2011) (describing spending by, and outstanding debts of, school districts). 
465 See, e.g., James W. Guthrie & Arthur Peng, A Warning for All Who Would Listen—America’s 
Public Schools Face a Forthcoming Fiscal Tsunami, in STRETCHING THE SCHOOL DOLLAR 19, 21 
(Frederick M. Hess & Eric Osberg eds., 2010) (describing how school districts occasionally become 
insolvent, sometimes requiring states to oversee such districts). 
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aggressive role in school funding.466 Evolving ideas respecting education 
and government’s duties may have contributed, but the new responsibility 
was often thrust on states by court decisions.467 Starting in the 1970s, more 
than half of the state supreme courts interpreted their constitutions’ 
educational clauses as mandating minimal funding for schools.468 
Consequently, the majority of states now set a per-student amount of 
funding each district must enjoy, and enforce formulas to subsidize districts 
that cannot autonomously raise those amounts.469 States thus regulate local 
educational spending’s floor.470 The state’s role does not end there, 
however. Some states also enforce a ceiling.471 Most have some sort of limit 
on tax rates school districts can charge.472 A few go further, dictating the 
specific tax rate to be raised for schools or the portion of local revenues 
dedicated to schools.473 Many states simply deprive districts of fiscal 
powers: school boards submit budgets to the appropriate general 
government for approval and tax levying.474  
Whether or not the school district preserves its formal fiscal 
independence, almost everywhere the state thus both finances local schools 
and polices local revenue and expenditure levels.475 In East Ramapo, for 
example, the state, not the school district, guarantees minimal support for 
466 Berry, supra note 411, at 54. 
467 Sheila E. Murray et al., Education-Finance Reform and the Distribution of Education 
Resources, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 789, 789 (1998); e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Cal. 
1971); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 189 (Ky. 1989); McDuffy v. Sec’y of the 
Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 
1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989). 
468 For a summary by state, see SCHOOLFUNDING.INFO, http://www.schoolfunding.info
[https://perma.cc/3GV6-ZME4]. 
469 Liz Kramer, Achieving Equitable Education Through the Courts: A Comparative Analysis of 
Three States, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 15–18 (2002). 
470 In 2014, $288.6 billion of school systems’ revenue came from the state, $52.9 billion from 
federal sources, and $276.2 billion from local sources. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, G14-ASPEF, PUBLIC 
EDUCATION FINANCES: 2014, at xi (2016). 
471 Daniel R. Mullins, Fiscal Limitations on Local Choice, in STATE AND LOCAL FISCAL POLICY 
201, 203 (Sally Wallace ed., 2010) (noting that all but three states enforce such ceilings). 
472 E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-972 (2017); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 387.195 (West 2017). 
473 California’s constitution actually requires such legislation. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 21. 
474 Only thirty-four states still have fiscally independent boards. MAEROFF, supra note 48, at 31. 
Even in those states, some districts are deprived of the power. E.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2576 
(McKinney 2017). 
475 Sharon N. Kioko, Structure of State-Level Tax and Expenditure Limits, 31 PUB. BUDGETING &
FIN. 43, 46 (2011). The resultant negation of local autonomy can count as unconstitutional. Neeley v. 
W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 797–98 (Tex. 2005) (striking down a
school tax cap as amounting to a state tax).
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schools.476 Within the current contours of American law, the school 
district’s separation from general governments is mostly irrelevant for the 
purpose of sustaining minimal funding levels the state deems necessary.  
Worse still, in many states the effect of the school district’s separate 
standing on school funding is not neutral: it is sometimes detrimental. 
Inevitably, the school district’s detached political status generates a 
competition over revenues with other local governments drawing on the 
same property tax base. Each government’s political leader craves a larger 
portion of the joint income pie to employ for the attainment of visible 
achievements within her responsibility field—at the expense of 
expenditures in fields for whose performance she herself is unaccountable 
to voters. A mayor will seek to capture local resources so she can spend 
them on street improvements, park expansion, police services, and the like, 
rather than on the schools for which she is not responsible. A school board 
official will seek to seize those same resources precisely for this latter 
use—the only one for which she is responsible. In this competition, the 
playing field may be tilted against school districts’ leaders. Districts’ fiscal 
powers are almost invariably more constrained than those of other local 
governments.477 At the same time, general governments may employ legal 
tools—most prominently, tax increment financing (TIF)—to divert some of 
the school district’s portion of local tax revenues into their own coffers.478 
The TIF’s rise serves as a sad coda to the school district’s promise of 
guaranteeing funding for schools. The district is immaterial today as a tool 
to assure adequate financing—as that assurance is now provided by the 
state. The independent school district may actually defeat the goal of 
expanding school financing opportunities by incentivizing general 
governments, released of schooling responsibilities, to take measures to 
reduce educational funding.  
476 The New York Court of Appeals has held that the state is constitutionally obliged to ensure the 
availability of a “sound basic education” to all its children. Bd. of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. 
Dist. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 369–70 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1982). Consequently, the state provides local 
districts with subsidies to meet minimal funding standards. Id. 
477 MAEROFF, supra note 48, at 31–33. 
478 Under a TIF, a territorial district is created within a city, and revenues generated by applying the 
tax rate to increases in property values within the district above the values at the time of its creation are, 
for the life of the district, set aside and paid to the city alone (to the exclusion of all other local tax 
authorities, such as the school district, covering the TIF district), supposedly for further improvements 
within the district. Richard Briffault, The Most Popular Tool: Tax Increment Financing and the 
Political Economy of Local Government, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 65, 67 (2010). TIFs have consequently 
been costly to some school districts. Rachel Weber et al., The Effect of Tax Increment Financing on 
School District Revenues: Regional Variation and Interjurisdictional Competition, 40 ST. & LOC. GOV. 
REV. 27, 37–40 (2008) (noting that while TIFs have benefitted rural and certain urban districts such as 
Chicago, other urban districts were harmed by TIFs). 
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E. Summary: The Modern School District’s Normative Deficiencies
This Part’s analysis indicated that today, unlike in the past, the
independence of the school district is not normatively worthwhile. That is 
not to say that the normative values that originally, as seen in Part II, gave 
rise to the school district in American law are no longer relevant. Those 
values—representation, small-scale community building, expertise, and 
stable funding—each still enjoy strong backing among thinkers, courts, and 
policymakers. The problem is that modern developments have handicapped 
the independent school district’s ability to surpass the general government 
in the delivery of these goals. Low turnout and interest group dominance 
render school districts an inferior representative arena. School district 
consolidation detached districts from “genuine” communities; still worse, 
court decisions transformed school districts into mechanisms for excluding 
community members. Other court rulings, proclaiming that the school 
district is not a special district, mean that its potential for expertise-driven 
management cannot surpass the city’s. The state’s commandeering of 
school-funding duties decreased the significance of the school district’s 
independent standing for financing purposes; due to intergovernmental 
competition over resources sometimes that standing is now financially 
detrimental.  
Currently, in sum, the school district fails to outperform the general 
government on every normative value; on three (participation, community 
building, and stable funding) it potentially, if not actually, underperforms 
it. Thus, the special place American law has for centuries reserved for the 
school district no longer appears justifiable. If questions remain, they are 
not about the functioning and potential of the school district: they are about 
the functioning and potential of American law without the school district. 
The Article’s next, and final, Part addresses those possible questions. 
IV. BEYOND THE SCHOOL DISTRICT
If a separate local government for education is not normatively 
superior to the local general government, the latter should gain authority 
over the field. In local government law, cities and counties are the default 
local governments: as general governments they wield most powers 
reserved to localities. Thus, in and of itself, Part III’s conclusion should 
lead lawmakers to consider school districts’ abolition and transfer of 
educational powers to general governments—a move facing no legal 
impediments in most states, as all local governments are state creatures.479 
479 E.g., Fruit v. Metro. Sch. Dist. of Winchester–White River Twp., 172 N.E.2d 864, 866 (Ind. 
1961) (holding that an act compelling school district consolidation was not invalid under the state 
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Still, its normative desirability and legal ease notwithstanding, this 
suggested move represents a break from a longstanding practice of 
American law, as Part II related. Thus an overview of its practical effects 
may be helpful. This concluding Part outlines the potential workings of the 
general government once tasked with governing schools.480 Specifically, it 
demonstrates how these workings can advance the normative values 
traditionally ascribed to local control of education, as identified in the 
preceding Parts.  
To draw a full image of the suggested reform’s potentialities, the 
discussion is divided into two Sections. The first Section underlines the 
congeniality of general governments’ modern structure to effective control 
of education, highlighting that structure’s capacity to negotiate competing 
values of participation and expertise. The second Section singles out legal 
mechanisms that will enable general governments, once in control of 
education, to transcend challenges of scale and alleviate the tension 
between interests in community building—necessitating small-scale 
governments—and in shoring up school funding—which benefit from 
economies of scale. Each Section will also introduce the pertinent existing 
reforms to school governance some states have already toyed with in the 
last few years.  
A. Structure: Balancing Representation and Expertise
Once awarded powers over education, how will general governments 
handle the responsibility? Some readers, even if persuaded that the school 
district is an ineffective institution, may be apprehensive about the city or 
county taking charge. Given the negative image of city politics dominating 
American consciousness and law,481 they may contemplate with dread the 
answer to the question. But in actuality the answer is reassuring. The 
source of skepticism is the paucity of precedents for cities governing 
constitution, notwithstanding township disapproving vote); Tuohy v. Barrington Consol. High Sch. 
Dist. No. 224, 71 N.E.2d 86, 91 (Ill. 1947) (holding consolidation and detachment of school districts 
constitutional); State v. Bd. of Educ. of Chetopa, 252 P.2d 859, 868–69 (Kan. 1953) (“[T]here are no 
vested rights in the existence of a school district and . . . the legislature has authority to extend or limit 
its boundaries, consolidate two or more as one, or to abolish a district altogether.”). But see Mendoza v. 
California, 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 505, 529 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (striking down mayoral takeover of the Los 
Angeles school board). 
480 The choice between city and county will depend on the size of the relevant community. Another 
potential model can be found in states that currently have school districts’ boundaries which correlate to 
both county and city lines, as seen in Section I.C.1. 
481 See Frug, supra note 20, at 1109–20; Michael Tager, Corruption and Party Machines in New 
York City, 3 CORRUPTION & REFORM 28, 30 (1988). See generally MORTON & LUCIA WHITE, THE 
INTELLECTUAL VERSUS THE CITY (1962). 
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education, not cities’ governmental structure.482 This Section will show that 
through their existing institutional architecture, cities can now effectively 
merge expert management with democratic accountability in school 
administration. 
On the expertise side of the equation, the general government of the 
twenty-first century is no alien to the production of complex services. 
Education is not dissimilar to other highly professionalized services general 
governments already provide—e.g., policing or transportation—and for 
which they have developed over the twentieth century robust organizational 
frameworks.483 Namely, while the general government’s political bodies—
e.g., mayor and council—set general policies in such fields, actual
management is vested in experts—e.g., the police or transportation
department.484 Political involvement is delineated: the department head—
police or transportation commissioner—is a mayoral appointee (often
subject to city council confirmation)485 but lower ranked managers and
employees are civil servants.486 An education department within the general
government will function in a similarly professional manner.487 No less than
an independent government for education, an education department within
city government could thus be a hub of expertise run by professionals.
Furthermore, such a department may promote efficient management 
even better than the existing independent school district, since it will 
interact with the city’s other professional departments.488 In reality, as 
opposed to current institutional design, education is never disconnected 
from other local policies: for example, the location and size of schools is 
dictated by land-use decisions, while in turn, schools’ location and size 
482 In addition, nowadays, school districts are just as prone to mismanagement and corruption as 
cities, and it is far from clear that their public image is better than that of general governments. For 
example, in Newark, during the years it was still elected, the school board was at least as dysfunctional 
as city government. RUSSAKOFF, supra note 11, at 19–20. 
483 WONG ET AL., supra note 383, at 6 (“[I]f democracy can be trusted to safeguard our social 
services, police forces and other essential services, why wouldn’t it work to protect our most precious 
resource, our children?” (quoting New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg)). 
484 E.g., CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE tit. 2 (2016) (creating departments and commissions). 
485 Id. § 2-102-020 (specifying that the mayor appoints the transportation commissioner subject to 
council approval); id. § 2-84-040 (specifying the same for police superintendent); N.Y.C., N.Y., 
CHARTER ch. 1, § 6 (2009) (“The mayor shall appoint the heads of administrations, departments, all 
commissioners . . . .”). 
486 On civil service laws, see 3 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 
§ 12:124, Westlaw (database updated Mar. 2017).
487 Robert H. Salisbury, Schools and Politics in the Big City, 37 HARV. EDUC. REV. 408, 421–22
(1967) (noting the mistaken assumption that under city control, professionals will lose their 
prominence). 
488 Michael D. Usdan, Mayoral Leadership in Education: Current Trends and Future Directions, 
76 HARV. EDUC. REV. 147, 149 (2006). 
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have marked effects on the surrounding built environment;489 schools 
require transportation accommodations and police support; and aid to poor 
students is not confined to the classroom.490 In current law, however, 
education’s management, vested in a separate government, is severed from 
the management of these other services. Prospects at coordination and 
better overall performance are inevitably hampered. In a role reversal, 
therefore, if awarded control over schools, the general government, by 
integrating all disparate services under one roof (through disparate 
professional departments operating within one city hall), could be the better 
purveyor of professionalism for educational management as compared to 
the school district.  
This stance has been embraced by many state legislatures.491 
Dismayed by urban schools’ performance, and pinning part of the blame on 
the supposedly unduly politicized school district, they turned to the general 
government as antidote.492 Starting in the late 1980s, laws were passed 
conferring control over several major cities’ school boards on mayors, as 
mentioned in Section I.C.2.493 These acts are promoted as serving a 
professionalized, business-like approach to school management.494 Often 
they follow a state takeover of school districts graded “failing”—indicating 
disquiet over school districts’ vices and faith in city management’s 
virtues.495 
But city control of schools, as suggested here, is promising not only in 
these terms of professional management already associated with mayoral 
489 See, e.g., Gurba v. Cmty. High Sch. Dist. No. 155, 40 N.E.3d 1, 7–8 (Ill. 2015) (holding that the 
school district was subject to municipality’s zoning powers and hence could not construct higher 
bleachers for a football stadium that negatively affected the property values of surrounding properties). 
The result was enacted into Illinois law in late August 2016. 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-13-27 (2016). 
490 See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 400 (N.J. 1990) (noting that poverty, poor housing, 
poor nutrition, and other conditions linked to poverty affect children in a manner that is likely to 
depress their educational performance). 
491 DAVID R. BERMAN, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE STATES 126 (2003). 
492 WONG ET AL., supra note 383, at 31, 40 (discussing the takeover of school districts in Boston 
and New York); Alan D. Bersin, Making Schools Productive, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (June 5, 2005), 
http://legacy.sandiegouniontribune.com/uniontrib/20050605/news_lz1e5making.html [https://perma.cc/
J4MA-CS59]. 
493 For a list of appointed boards, see NAT’L SCH. BDS. ASS’N, SELECTION OF LOCAL SCHOOL
BOARDS (2009), https://www.nsba.org/sites/default/files/reports/electionschart.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
M4C4-QEHT]. 
494 Jeffrey R. Henig, Mayoral Control: What We Can and Cannot Learn from Other Cities, in
WHEN MAYORS TAKE CHARGE, supra note 456, at 25 (“[I]n many of the places that have adopted 
mayoral control, state legislators and civic leaders have simply concluded that the school boards they 
have tried to work with are amateurish . . . .”); Joseph P. Viteritti, Why Governance Matters, in WHEN 
MAYORS TAKE CHARGE, supra note 456, at 5–7. 
495 WONG ET AL., supra note 383, at 30–47 (discussing Chicago, Cleveland, Hartford, and Detroit 
as examples). 
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control: it portends gains in the terms of the other important normative 
component of governance—democratic participation. Current reforms 
instituting mayoral control of schools are often criticized for their failings 
in this regard.496 Inevitably, the suspension of elections for school boards in 
favor of mayoral appointees interferes with representation values.497 
Minority groups have especially felt sidelined.498 In some cities, the 
mayoral-control scheme’s unpopularity led to its downfall.499 Even where it 
persists, mayoral control is often temporary, conditioned on periodic 
legislative renewals,500 because, as seen in Section I.C.2, the school board is 
still not legally integrated into city government.501 Conversely, this Article 
suggests full integration. Such reform will not only improve on this stopgap 
nature of mayoral control, but also, and more importantly, addresses 
mayoral control’s substantive weakness—its democratic deficit.502 Full 
integration entails education’s subjection to full city/county governance—
not solely to the mayor.503 Through their council representatives, 
communities will supervise educational decisionmaking—as they supervise 
all other local decisionmaking.504  
496 See 1 COMM’N ON SCH. GOV., FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON SCHOOL GOVERNANCE 
16–17 (2008) (recommending that mayoral control of the schools be reformed to allow for more input 
from parents). 
497 Courts have upheld the practice regardless. Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 393–94 (6th Cir. 
1999); Cohanim v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 204 F. Supp. 2d 452, 455 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); Harrisburg Sch. 
Dist. v. Zogby, 828 A.2d 1079, 1092–93 (Pa. 2003). But see Mendoza v. California, 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
505, 508–09 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). 
498 Jeffrey R. Henig & Wilbur C. Rich, Mayor-centrism in Context, in MAYORS IN THE MIDDLE 3, 
18 (Jeffrey R. Henig & Wilbur C. Rich eds., 2004). 
499 WONG ET AL., supra note 383, at 45–49 (discussing Detroit and Washington, D.C. as examples). 
500 E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7A-49(h) (Westlaw 2017) (requiring the state board to renew the 
order placing a school district under state control every three years); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2590-b 
(McKinney 2017). 
501 New York City is a partial exception. The board—appointed by the mayor—was rendered 
advisory, deprived of executive powers. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2590-g (McKinney 2017). The power to 
“[c]ontrol and operate” the school was vested in a chancellor, serving at the mayor’s pleasure. Id. 
§ 2590-h. Still, other democratically elected city bodies have no powers over the schools. City of New
York v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co., 2010 WL 3069654, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that “[w]hatever
his status vis-à-vis the City,” the Comptroller has no relationship to the school board, and “the City and
the Board remain separate legal entities” (quoting Perez ex rel. Torres v. City of New York,
837 N.Y.S.2d 571 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007)); see also Perez, 837 N.Y.S.2d at 572.
502 DOROTHY SHIPPS, SCHOOL REFORM, CORPORATE STYLE 4 (2006) (critiquing mayoral control). 
503 Jackson, Mississippi, offers an interesting example. Since 2010, the mayor appoints board 
members but they must be confirmed by the council. Still, the board maintains its separate legal 
standing. MISS. CODE. ANN. § 37-7-203(3) (Westlaw 2017). 
504 WONG ET AL., supra note 383, at 22 (arguing that the problem of mayoral control is 
centralization, not the supposedly inherent representative qualities of the displaced separate school 
board). 
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Such supervision should be more democratically effective than current 
school board elections. As Section III.A stressed, participation rates in 
general local elections are higher than in school board elections and thus 
general governments are less prone to special interest capture. Moreover, 
limited existing experience indicates that when general governments wield 
educational powers, education immediately tops the list of debated general-
election topics.505 Thus not only can the general government offer efficient 
management—through its professionalized departments—it also promises 
democratic gains, through more truly popular elections.506   
As Part II’s historical investigation discovered, American law 
recognized the school district because general governments were 
nonexistent, or once existent, were imperfect facilitators of meaningful 
participation and unpalatable conduits for expert management. That view 
of city politics, though, is now anachronistic. With municipal services’ 
professionalization and their—at least partial—detachment from old-style 
political machines, the city, even if not an optimal management body, often 
offers better prospects for expertise and representation than the school 
district.507 Some states acknowledge this reality, and turn to mayoral 
control. Yet these reforms do not go far enough organizationally, while 
going too far normatively. They maintain the legally separate school 
board—with its attendant financial costs—but centralize control in one 
person—with its attendant democratic costs. Striking a better balance 
between expertise and representation values, the full integration of 
education into general governments will improve on this scheme—and on 
the still-prevalent separately elected school board scheme.  
B. Scale: Balancing Community Building and Stable Funding
Modern general governments’ internal structures are thus probably up
to the task of effectively running schools. But would their external 
boundaries not obstruct the effort? Unlike school districts, general 
governments were not created with education’s governance in mind. 
Accordingly, some may be concerned that these governments’ geographic 
coverage areas might be too big (inhibiting efforts at community building 
505 Id. at 28. 
506 Id. at 20 (noting that relative to board elections, general elections are high-profile, not single 
issue, and hence interest groups have less influence). 
507 In an indication that boards are now prone to corrupt practices characteristic of old city 
machines, states pass acts setting special ethics duties for them, prohibit their interference in 
professional affairs, regulate their reimbursement practices, etc. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-63 
(Westlaw through Act 10 of 2017 Legis. Sess.); LA. STAT. ANN § 17:81(P) (Westlaw through 2017 First 
Extraordinary Sess.). Both laws were adopted in the aftermath of breathtaking school district corruption 
cases. 
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through schools) or too small (increasing costs and undermining stable 
school funding). Of course, as Part III highlighted, current school districts 
themselves are not particularly hospitable to either value.508 But to soothe 
remaining doubts, this Section identifies two mechanisms now available to 
general governments that enable them to transcend their scale’s potential 
limitations: micro-local reforms (allowing general governments to 
accommodate smaller communities), and interlocal agreements (allowing 
them to capitalize on economies of scale). 
As seen in Part II, general governments were not tapped to run schools 
partially because those governments’ large scale normally diverges from 
the boundaries of genuine communities centered around individual schools. 
But today, a legal fix is available for this handicap. The fix was developed 
since that handicap now also afflicts, as Section III.B demonstrated, the 
school district. To reattach education governance to the individual school, 
states recognize school-level councils, operating underneath the existing 
school district.509 These micro-local entities can engage in the community-
building function to which the local government governing the schools—
currently the school district—cannot contribute. Over the past two decades, 
many states have established such site-based councils consisting of 
teachers, parents, and other community members, albeit only as advisory 
bodies.510 In a small, though growing, number of places these councils also 
hold meaningful powers, determining curriculum and hiring teachers.511 
These prevalent micro-local reforms—especially if their reinforcement 
presses on and spreads—can answer the challenge of effective community 
building under a government, like the general government suggested here, 
that may cover a large area and population.  
While capacity for community building is a (solvable) challenge 
generated by the general government’s bigness, another potential 
challenge—the capacity to assure stable funding—is presented by the 
general government’s smallness. Any service’s provision benefits from 
economies of scale: as the service’s scope expands, the cost per unit of 
added service decreases since fixed costs are spread over a larger number 
of output units.512 Since some costs of construction, administration, and 
teaching are fixed, it is cheaper to operate one school serving four hundred 
508 Generally, the effects of the size of a governing body on education quality are unclear. Berry, 
supra note 411, at 56–57 (reviewing contradictory findings). 
509 For an overview, see Shoked, supra note 25, at 1341–43. 
510 Shoked, supra note 25, at 1341. 
511 E.g., 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/34-2.3(1) (2016); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 160.345(2) (West 
2017). 
512 RONALD J. OAKERSON, GOVERNING LOCAL PUBLIC ECONOMIES 16 (1999). 
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students than to have four schools, each serving one hundred students.513 A 
general government might be too small physically to draw on these 
economies of scale.  
This worry about the limits set by the general government’s potential 
small size is exaggerated, if not misplaced. Legal units routinely overcome 
the economic constraints set by physical smallness through the plainest of 
legal devices: contracts. Thus already today, general governments that 
cannot independently realize economies of scale achieve them through 
cooperation with neighboring general governments.514 The law enables 
these agreements that local governments regularly employ to jointly 
provide diverse services such as policing and transit.515 For educational 
services too, existing school districts often contract to permit interdistrict 
student transfers, to rely on other districts’ special education facilities, and 
more.516 Thus an individual general government’s physical smallness would 
not jeopardize its effective operation and financing of schools. The small 
general government will contract around the problem. 
Some may contend, however, that a general government’s financial 
drawbacks in operating schools will stem not from its inability to 
economically fund schools, but from an unwillingness to sufficiently fund 
schools—a problem for which contractual solutions are irrelevant. This 
concern relates not to the general government’s physical size, but to its 
substantive scope: since the general government holds many 
responsibilities—not only education—it may choose to spend its revenue 
elsewhere.517 But this is an imaginary concern. As explained in Section 
III.D, state governments dictate minimal levels of school funding. Hence,
the general government, if awarded responsibility for the schools, like the
school district responsible for them today, will never be free to wholly
underfund schools.518 If it opts not to fund schools beyond state-mandated
minimal levels—prioritizing other local services, say policing or economic
development—that decision, responding to a democratic and economic
513 BERMAN, supra note 491, at 132. 
514 See Clayton P. Gillette, Regionalization and Interlocal Bargains, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 190, 210–
12 (2001) (describing various motivations for such interdistrict contracts). 
515 ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, METROPOLITAN AMERICA:
CHALLENGE TO FEDERALISM 87–88 (1966). 
516 E.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 1950 (McKinney 2017) (setting a framework for interdistrict 
“cooperative educational services”). 
517 Salisbury, supra note 487, at 424. 
518 See Town of Dartmouth v. Greater New Bedford Reg’l Vocational Tech. High Sch. Dist., 
961 N.E.2d 83, 93–94 (Mass. 2012) (holding that a local agreement to divert school funding was 
preempted by state law); Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of New York v. City of New York, 
362 N.E.2d 948, 950–51 (N.Y. 1977) (upholding the state’s power to bar the city from reducing the 
share of its budget apportioned for schools). 
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calculation of citizens’ needs and wants, is normatively justified. Whether 
or not education needs win out this democratic and Tieboutian calculation, 
such an informed competition between local issues will represent an 
improvement over current allocation patterns.519 As Section III.D 
documented, the division of funds between schools and other local 
priorities is today often the product of the much less principled bureaucratic 
competition between local entities (general government and school 
district).520  
Combining schools’ management with the management of other local 
services does not portend inherently worse, or less rational, patterns of 
allocation of funds to the school system. Neither, as this Section explained, 
does it threaten encumbering that system with impractical physical 
boundaries. The move to commit educational powers to general 
governments—suggested here—does not imply that educational services 
and policy will invariably be pegged to those entities’ boundaries. Under 
city or county rule, some decisions could be made on a scale smaller than 
the city or county—i.e., on the individual school level—to serve 
community-building interests. Other decisions could be reached on a scale 
larger than the city or county—i.e., on the state or interlocal levels—to 
serve financing interests. In its suggested role as focal point for education 
governance, the contemporary general government materializes as a 
promising arbiter of activities taking place on disparate local levels and as a 
fair assessor of the demands of disparate policy needs. 
C. Summary: Why the General Government?
The general government is an appealing alternative to the school 
district’s dominance in the educational field not solely due to the latter’s 
failings—identified in Part III—but also thanks to its own potential, 
established in this Part. Thanks to its existing structures—political leaders 
elected in contested general elections who supervise an administration of 
civil servants—the general government can effectively reflect residents’ 
preferences and promote professionalized management; thanks to legal 
mechanisms—micro-local individual school councils and interlocal 
contracts—it can overcome limits of scale to accommodate smaller scale 
519 There is reason to believe that due to its political salience education will be strongly positioned 
in the competition over resources among the city’s multiple responsibilities. See, e.g., Wong & Farris, 
supra note 109, at 231–32 (describing how once education becomes a city concern, media coverage 
increases and elected officials allocate more attention—and resources—to it). 
520 See also Irby v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 889 F.2d 1352, 1355 (4th Cir. 1989) (noting that one 
justification for appointed boards is avoiding fragmented fiscal responsibility). 
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decisionmaking for community-building purposes and larger scale 
cooperation for money-saving purposes.  
That is not to say that granting general governments control over 
education will cure all the maladies afflicting American schools: 
meaningful racial integration may require regional bodies;521 equitable 
funding may require more state involvement;522 elevated overall quality 
may require federal intervention.523 But some pitfalls currently besetting the 
school district-dominated system will be avoided if general governments 
run the schools. Recall the Introduction’s East Ramapo and Newark. 
Awarded educational powers, the villages and towns in East Ramapo 
whose residents are actually concerned with public education will 
undoubtedly contract to jointly operate schools—achieving economies of 
scale without seeing school funding diverted to other purposes by officials 
unconcerned with public education. For its part, if asked to run the schools, 
the City of Newark’s leadership, elected in broad, competitive elections,524 
could not continuously mismanage school funds and favor employees as 
easily as the old elected board of the school district did.525  
In 2017, unlike in times past, there is limited reason to fear city 
power; conversely, there is much reason to fear school district power. 
Already-adopted steps to empower mayors or school-level councils 
indicate the weakening hold of the school district on the American legal 
imagination. That, however, is not enough. The school district’s grip 
should be fully dislodged, for only then might the full potential of local 
control be unleashed.  
CONCLUSION 
Many school districts throughout the country are flourishing. In all 
likelihood, most readers have either attended, or sent children to, a school 
in one of these thriving districts: districts that are the opposite image of the 
East Ramapo and Newark districts that launched this Article. These 
successful districts, serving relatively affluent communities, often live up to 
521 See Wilson, supra note 418, at 1421–24 (stating that “metropolitan fragmentation, in 
conjunction with localism, creates inequalities between neighboring localities” and suggesting 
regionalism as an alternative to localism in public education (citations and footnotes omitted)). 
522 See Laurie Reynolds, Full State Funding of Education as a State Constitutional Imperative, 
60 HASTINGS L.J. 749, 758–59 (2009) (“Because some of the largest gaps between rich and poor school 
districts occur in states with the lowest percentage of state funding, most state funding reform 
involves . . . an increase in the percentage of the state’s share of the total education budget.” (citations 
and footnote omitted)). 
523 E.g., 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2012) (identifying the purpose of federal supervision). 
524 See RUSSAKOFF, supra note 11, at 13, 206–08 (describing Newark’s general election contests). 
525 Id. at 19. 
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the school district’s original promise: highly trained professionals offer 
outstanding education to students; residents actively participate in elections 
and debates over contested issues; funding is never a concern; and 
communities rally around schools through PTAs, extracurricular activities, 
and the like.526 In other words, expertise, participation, stable funding, and 
community building—all the values historically associated with the school 
district—are alive and well in those districts today.  
But as this Article illustrated, even there these values are sustained not 
thanks to the institution of the school district, but despite it. Even in the 
best functioning of school districts, the general government, if awarded 
educational powers, should easily meet the performance standard set by the 
school district. In many other school districts—the lesser functioning of 
school districts—the general government would normatively outperform 
the school district. The conclusion, therefore, is inescapable: three hundred 
years in, the time is ripe for American law to consider setting aside that 
uniquely American oddity, the school district.  
526 IOWA ASS’N OF SCH. BDS., IASB’S LIGHTHOUSE STUDY: SCHOOL BOARDS AND STUDENT 
ACHIEVEMENT (2000), http://connecticutlighthouse.org/Reports/LHI-Compass.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8DXR-KX8G] (detecting these performance levels among high-achieving districts). 
